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REVIEWING AGENCY ACTION FOR INCONSISTENCY
WITH PRIOR RULES AND REGULATIONS
HAROLD

J.

KRENT*

Judicial review remains an essential, if at times controversial,
check on administrative action. Judges protect individuals and firms
from the coercive power of the regulatory state. They review administrative action both for procedural regularity and substantive coherence under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") 1 and
countless regulatory schemes. Given bureaucrats' lack of political accountability, external monitoring appears critical to rein in arbitrary
or overly intrusive bureaucratic conduct. The propriety of external
review seems even more pressing given the reality of interest group
pressure, whether from the mining lobby or the Environmental Defense Fund.
Monitoring, however, need not take the form of judicial review.
Congress, the President, and even regulated groups may also watch
over administrative action. All can exert important checks limiting
and shaping agency regulation.
Indeed, courts have recognized that their participation in the administrative process is not indispensable. They have acknowledged
their own institutional constraints when faced with the prospect of reviewing certain types of administrative action. Courts have been reluctant to second-guess administrative decisions when judicially
administrable standards are wanting. Courts can review such openended administrative decisions only at the risk of supplanting agency
discretion with their own. The cost of judicial errors may eclipse the
benefits that can be obtained through judicial monitoring.
Several doctrines illustrate judicial unwillingness to intrude into
the administrative process. For instance, the Supreme Court has held
that administrative nonenforcement is presumptively unreviewable
* Professor and Associate Dean, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I would like to thank
Yoav Dotan, Sanford Greenberg, Ron Levin, Peter Raven-Hansen, and John Rogers for their
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank Martin Madden and Michael
Reilly for their research assistance.
1. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1994 & Supp. 111996). Section 706 authorizes judges to
"hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion... [or] without observance of procedures required by law." Id.
at § 706.
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under the APA 2 because it "often involves a complicated balancing of

a number of factors which are peculiarly within [the agency's] exper-

4
tise."'3 Similarly, the Court has declined to review through tort suits
agency action that is "grounded in social, economic, and political policy."'5 Courts have thus invoked the discretionary function exception
in the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") 6 on countless occasions to

protect agency discretion. Moreover, the Court has refused to disturb
an agency's distribution of regulatory benefits. 7 Assuming legislative

authorization, agencies can generally decide whether to confine or
withdraw governmental subsidies free from judicial supervision.
Agency action in all three contexts will be checked, if at all, by other

actors within our political system, whether Congress or the President.
Yet, at the same time, courts reassert authority to monitor administrative action when they can measure the conduct against a judicially
administrable yardstick. Thus, in the administrative nonenforcement
context, courts review challenges when the challenger asserts that the
agency's nonenforcement is inconsistent with an agency rule. 8 Courts
similarly review agency action grounded in economic and social policy, despite the existence of the discretionary function exception,
when the agency's action contravenes a previously formulated rule or
regulation. 9 And, if agencies (or legislatures) bind themselves to con-

fer a regulatory entitlement on an individual or group, then the Court
will force the agencies to comply with due process guarantees in determining whether an entitlement is due. 10
2. See id. § 701(a)(2) (precluding from review those issues "committed to agency discretion by law").
3. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
4. Congress partially waived its immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2671-80 (1994), excepting claims "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a) (the discretionary function exception).
5. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467
U.S. 797, 814 (1984).
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a); supra note 4.
7. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
8. See, e.g., Clifford v. Pefia, 77 F.3d 1414 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Diebold v. United States, 947
F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1991); Cardoza v. CFTC, 768 F.2d 1542 (7th Cir. 1985).
9. See, e.g., Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) (holding that if officials
had "no rightful option but to adhere to the directive," then the agency action was reviewable);
Irving v. United States, 49 F.3d 830 (1st Cir. 1995).
10. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Regulatory estoppel poses another
analogy. See generally Peter Raven-Hansen, Regulatory Estoppel: When Agencies Break Their
Own "Laws," 64 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1985); Joshua I. Schwartz, The Irresistible Force Meets the
Immovable Object: Estoppel Remedies for the Agency's Violation of Its Own Regulations or
Other Misconduct, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 653 (1992).
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The courts' assertion of review underscores a perplexing anomaly
underlying much of administrative law. When no standards control
agency action, courts will leave untouched the agency's exercise of discretion despite a pressing need for monitoring. In contrast, when the
agency action is less discretionary in light of prior guidelines, then
courts will review the action even though external monitoring is arguably less critical.
In effect, courts have adopted a second-best solution to the problem of discretionary agency action that is otherwise unreviewable-if
the agency ties its own hands through regulations or directives, then
the court will enforce such substantive restrictions on the agency's authority." In the courts' view, review for compliance with preexisting
rules does not usurp the agency's role as policymaker. Rather, review
forces agencies to respect the rule of law and the reliance interests of
third parties affected by agency regulation. When agencies fail to
comply with their own rules, they open themselves to external review.
In Part I, this article sketches judicial doctrine in the three areas
previously mentioned. The courts recognize in these contexts that
they should not disturb the agency's discretionary exercise of authority because of the complex resource allocation and social policy considerations implicated. Much of the reasoning in this article is
premised on the assumption that the costs of judicial review at times
exceed whatever benefits accrue from enhanced judicial monitoring.
In the three enclaves, however, courts have fashioned an exception to
permit review when the agency has sufficiently committed itself to a
particular course of action. In principal part, the courts' rationale for
review rests on the fact that agencies no longer retain discretion if a
prior course of action has been pledged.
The article suggests in Part II that the courts' approach is misguided. Although the impulse to exercise review over discretionary
administrative action is understandable, the consequences can be perverse. Courts insufficiently have recognized that permitting thirdparty review of an agency's compliance with its own policy may have
substantially adverse effects. First, agencies may respond to such judicial decisions by rescinding regulations or changing directives to prevent judicial oversight. Under current doctrine, judges will not
intervene as long as the agency does not commit itself to any particular action. Thus, the judicial tack discourages agencies from providing
11. Courts have stated that otherwise unreviewable agency action is reviewable for other
reasons as well. See infra note 34.
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information to the public, promulgating rules to ensure that similarly
situated individuals and firms are treated comparably, and effectively
controlling subordinate agency officials' actions. Second, and related,
judicial stress on previously established rules and regulations may, at
least as a theoretical matter, prevent agencies from changing prior directives even when change is in the public interest. Agencies ought to
alter policy when new social or political priorities so dictate. Third,
reviewing agency action for compliance with preexisting rules may
permit courts to effect policy by substituting their interpretation of the
prior rule-or their view as to how to enforce compliance with that
rule-for that of the agency. This is not to suggest that review for
compliance with preexisting rules is never warranted, but only that the
courts' doctrine in the three contexts is inadequately nuanced.
In Part III, the article canvasses several alternative courses that
courts could chart when confronting allegations that otherwise unreviewable agency action conflicts with preexisting rules and regulations. First, courts could withdraw from the fray and leave agency
action undisturbed. If the agency's decision is grounded in resource
allocation questions, then courts should stay their hand despite the
seeming presence of prior agency directives limiting the agencies' discretion. Second, courts could intervene when convinced that the private parties justifiably relied upon the previously articulated
directives. In related contexts, courts have distinguished between
agency rules directed at guiding officials' discretion and those aimed
at conferring rights on individuals and firms. 12 If agency rules are primarily directed at limiting the discretion of lower-level officials, then
such rules should not necessarily transform unreviewable agency action into an occasion for judicial review. Third, courts could inquire
whether the agency intended to bind lower-level officials. If so, then
ensuring that such officials conform to preexisting policy does not intrude markedly into agency discretion. Fourth, courts could make a
normative evaluation as to what type of rules they should force agen12. See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993) (construing congressional directive to agency as precatory only); Dong v. Slattery, 84 F.3d 82 (2d Cir.
1996) (refusing to enforce an executive order on immigration priorities); HHS v. Federal Labor
Relations Auth., 844 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (finding that an agency's compliance
with an executive order on contracting out was not subject to bargaining with a federal employee
union or oversight by a neutral arbitrator); Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d
228 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding an executive order not enforceable as law); Local 1498 v. American
Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 522 F.2d 486 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding an executive order not enforceable as law); Kuhl v. Hampton, 451 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1971) (finding executive order nonenforceable); Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski, 350 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding an
executive order regarding collective bargaining not enforceable by third parties).
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cies to follow, whether because of the reliance interest involved or the
need to constrain discretion in particular contexts. The Supreme
Court recently has adopted a similar approach when reviewing liberty
interest claims, distinguishing between claims "of 'real substance"'
and those that are more mundane. 13 Finally, courts could instead rely
on a process approach in the three contexts, scrutinizing agency departures from prior policy to ascertain whether the departures reflect
purposeful policy. Requiring a policy decision likely ensures that the
agency action has been pursued only after consideration of the resource and policy issues implicated. Thus, even if judges cannot review the ultimate product of agency decisionmaking, they can
augment the possibility that such actions are checked by the political
process. I tentatively conclude that, although none of the approaches
fits each setting perfectly, the process approach is best tailored to the
FTCA, APA, and due process contexts.

I.

DOCTRINES TO REVIEW OTHERWISE UNREVIEWABLE
AGENCY ACTION

Courts, as well as Congress, have determined that the costs of
judicial review of agency action at times outweigh the benefits. Review may be excessively expensive or, from a policy standpoint, unwise given the judiciary's comparative lack of expertise in determining
priorities for agency action. Thus, Congress and the courts have determined that judges should not second-guess certain discretionary
judgments under the APA or through the medium of a tort action
under the F-FCA. 14 Nonetheless, courts have asserted review over
otherwise unreviewable agency action if the agency allegedly acts inconsistently with a prior rule or regulation. Agencies presumably lack
the discretion to discard or ignore previously set rules, and the existence of such rules enables courts to weigh agency action against an
easily ascertainable standard. The presence of the prior guidelines
13. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477 (1995) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
557 (1974)).
14. See APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1994); FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1994). Congress, of
course, has determined that judicial review is unwarranted in other contexts as well. Congress
enjoys plenary power to make agency action unreviewable, at least as long as no constitutional
claims are involved. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837 (1984). For two disparate
examples, consider Congress's decision that the Office of Personnel Management's decisions as
to disability and dependency under the federal government's disability retirement program "are
final and conclusive and are not subject to review," 5 U.S.C. § 8347(c) (1994), as well as its
determination to preclude review of the FCC's award of a "pioneer preference" to three communications giants receiving broadband personal communications licenses, which amounted to
millions of dollars of discounts. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(13)(E) (1994).
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tips the calculus toward review-the benefits from judicial monitoring
exceed the costs of review in light of the diminished risk of judicial
usurpation of policymaking. Rule-of-law concerns suggest the importance of exercising review over what would otherwise be unreviewable

agency action.
A.

Committed to Agency Discretion By Law.

Although the historical record is not clear, 15 the framers of the
APA evidently envisioned that judicial review would be counterproductive in at least some administrative law settings. The APA pro-

vides that its mandate for review does not apply "to the extent
that . . .agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.'

16

The term "committed to agency discretion by law" is of course diaphanous and, as has been oft noted, difficult to harmonize with the APA's

general provision directing that agency action be set aside for an
17
"abuse of discretion."'
If agency action is to be reviewed for an
abuse of discretion, how can that discretion be committed solely to the

agency? The Supreme Court currently views § 701(a)(2) as a "narrow
exception"' 8 to the review provisions in the APA, applicable only

when the agency's action is premised on resource allocation or other
complex determinations that the judiciary is ill-suited to secondguess. 19
Heckler v. Chaney20 is a leading case. There, several death row
prisoners contested the Food & Drug Administration's failure to enforce the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 2' with respect to
drugs used in lethal injections. 22 The plaintiffs asserted that the drugs
15. See Raoul Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness:A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965 (1969)
(reviewing his ongoing debate with Kenneth Culp Davis as to the legislative history of the APA
bearing on reviewability).
16. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). The APA also precludes review "to the extent statutes preclude
judicial review." § 701 (a)(1).
17. Id. § 706(2)(A). The Attorney General's report on the APA unhelpfully noted that the
unreviewability section was intended to restate the prior law. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, APPENDIX TO ATrORNEY GENERAL'S STATEMENT REGARDING REVISED COMMIT-

TEE PRINT OF OCTOBER 5, 1945, S.REP.No. 79-752, at 43-44 (1st Sess. 1945). See generally John
M. Rogers, A Fresh Look at Agency "Discretion," 57 TUL. L. REV. 776, 787-92 (1983).
18. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
19. See id. In Overton Park, the Court stated that § 701(a)(2) "is applicable in those rare
instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to
apply."' Id. (quoting S. REP.No. 79-752, at 26 (1st Sess. 1945)). For persuasive critique of the
Overton Park formulation, see Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV.689, 704-10 (1990); Kenneth Culp Davis, "No Law to Apply," 25 SAN
DIEGO L. REV.1 (1988).
20. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
21. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
22. See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 823.
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had not been tested for the purpose for which they were to be used. 23
Use of the drug for capital punishment, in other words, constituted an
unapproved use of an approved drug. 24 The Court held the challenge
25
precluded from review.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court explained that agency failures to enforce were presumptively unreviewable. 26 Although the
Court focused on the failure to enforce context, its reasoning
presented a discernible theory underlying the APA's exception from
review:
[A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated
balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a violation
has occurred, but whether agency resources are best spent on this
violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it
acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits
the agency's overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has
enough resources to undertake the action at all .... The agency is
far better equipped than the courts to deal with 27
the many variables
involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.
When confronted by a challenge to the agency's allocation of
scarce enforcement resources, the courts ordinarily should decline review. Courts are poorly situated to second-guess the priorities that
led to the failure to enforce.
The Supreme Court soon extended the Chaney rationale beyond
the failure to enforce context. In Lincoln v. Vigil 28 plaintiffs challenged the decision by the Director of the Indian Health Service to
discontinue a special clinical service program in the southwest.29 The
Court overruled the court of appeals' determination that the Health
Service's turnabout was reviewable. 30 It reasoned:
Like the decision against instituting enforcement proceedings .... an agency's allocation of funds from a lump-sum appropriation requires "a complicated balancing of a number of factors which
are peculiarly within its expertise" . . . . As in [Chaney], . . .the
"agency [was] far better equipped than the courts to deal with the
'31
many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 837.
26. See id. at 831-32.
27. Id.
28. 508 U.S. 182 (1993).
29. See id. at 189.
30. See id. at 193-94.
31. Id. at 193 (quoting Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831-32). In between Chaney and Lincoln, the
Court held § 701(a)(2) applicable to preclude review in two additional cases not involving an
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The Court has therefore construed § 701(a)(2) to preclude review
over agency determinations that, for a variety of political and institutional reasons, are best left to the agency. In both cases, judicial review was certainly possible. In Chaney, for example, the Court could
have determined that the agency had failed to make a reasoned deter-

mination as to whether enforcement was warranted under the Act, or
it could have questioned whether the agency had correctly assessed

the facts when it decided not to enforce the Act. Similarly, in Lincoln,
the Court could have decided whether discontinuing the program was

consistent with the implicit recognition in the legislative history that
the clinics be funded. 32 Or, the Court could have determined that the
agency at least should have articulated why reallocating its resources

to a nationwide treatment program was more consistent with its statutory mandate than funding the clinics in the southwest.
Yet, to the Court, the likely costs of review outweighed the po-

tential benefit of increased monitoring despite the possible avenues of
review. 33 Courts were not as well positioned as agencies to determine
whether redeployment of the Health Service's resources would ultimately benefit Native Americans or whether the FDA correctly conserved resources to investigate other allegations of misbranded drugs.
The agency may well have been shortsighted in both cases, but courts
were even more likely to err given their inability to assess the resource
allocation questions involved.
Nonetheless, the Chaney Court suggested that judicial review of a
refusal to enforce might still be obtainable in several contexts, of
greatest relevance here when the agency's determination not to enagency's failure to enforce. In Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601, 603-04 (1988), the Court barred
(nonconstitutional) review of the CIA Director's discharge of a gay employee. The Court reasoned that the statutory language was so open-ended as to preclude judicial second-guessing of
the Director's determination. See id. at 600-01. The statute provided that "the Director of the
Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee
of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests
of the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 403(c) (1994); see also Webster, 486 U.S. at 600. In ICC v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE), 482 U.S. 270, 277 (1987), the Court barred review
of an agency's refusal to grant reconsideration of an ICC order with respect to crew operations.
The Court reasoned that because the unions could have challenged the order on grounds that
they raised in their motion for reconsideration, the subsequent denial of the reconsideration
motion was committed by law to agency discretion. See id. at 286.
32. See Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 190; cf. Vigil v. Rhoades, 953 F.2d 1225, 1229-30 (10th Cir.
1992) (giving weight to the implicit recognition in the legislative history), rev'd sub nom. Lincoln,
508 U.S. 182 (1993).
33. In essence, there is always "law" to apply-whether from the Constitution, positive law,
or common law. The question is, rather, the impact of deciding the particular claim. As a general matter, when no benchmarks exist, judicial resolution of a controversy is likely to usurp
agency policymaking. See Levin, supra note 19, at 734-50.
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force was inconsistent with the agency's rules. 34 Presumably, courts
could assume their traditional review function to restrain agency excesses or inadvertence when easily administrable constraints existed,

such as an agency rule inconsistent with the nonenforcement decision.
The Court could exercise a conventional role of resolving legal issues
without second-guessing resource allocation questions of the agency.
Thus, even in those contexts that would otherwise be committed by
law to agency discretion, judicial review could still be important if the
agency itself had curtailed its own discretion through a preexisting
rule.
Indeed, Congress retains the authority at all times to override the
presumption of no review and direct review despite the resource allo-

cation questions involved. If Congress (or agencies) authorize review,
then courts must grapple with the resource questions irrespective of
the agency's presumed superior expertise. 35 As the Court stated in
Chaney, "we essentially leave to Congress, and not to the courts, the
34. See 470 U.S. at 836. The other exceptions canvassed include a claim that the agency's
refusal was "based solely on the belief that it lacks jurisdiction," see id. at 833 n.4, that the
inaction violated the Constitution, see id. at 838, that the agency refused to commence rulemaking proceedings, see id. at 825 n.2, or that the agency "'consciously and expressly adopted a
general policy' that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities."
Id. at 833 n.4 (quoting Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)).
Several courts have also reviewed agency inaction based on the agency's articulated legal
stance. See, e.g., Montana Air Chapter No. 29 v. FLRA, 898 F.2d 753, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1990);
UAW v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In UAW v. Brock, the court wrote:
Even if a statutory interpretation is announced in the course of a nonenforcement decision, that does not mean that it escapes review altogether....
Were we to accept the Department's contention, we would be handing agencies
carte blanche to avoid review by announcing new interpretations of statutes only in the
context of decisions not to take enforcement action.
783 F.2d. at 246.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court signaled dissatisfaction with that exception to the unreviewability doctrine in ICC v. Brotherhoodof Locomotive Eng'rs (BLE), 482 U.S. 270 (1987).
There, two unions filed a petition to reconsider the agency's adverse determination as to usage
of particular tracks. See id. at 273-76. The ICC's denial of such a petition generally rests within
its discretion. See id. at 277-78. In this instance, however, the unions argued that the denial
should be reviewable because it was based on substantive legal grounds, and the ICC had responded to those arguments. See id. at 280-81. The Court explicitly rejected the argument, see
id. at 282-84, forwarded by Justice Stevens, that review should proceed because the agency had
based its denial of the motion on substantive legal grounds that were otherwise reviewable. See
id. at 290-91 (Stevens, J., concurring). In other words, much as in UAW v. Brock, Justice Stevens
asserted that agency reliance on legal reasons should open the door for review. Justice Scalia
denied that "if the agency gives a 'reviewable' reason for otherwise unreviewable action, the
action becomes reviewable." Id. at 283. To the Court, the fact that an agency action could be
reviewed did not justify review if the area were otherwise committed to agency discretion. See
id. at 282. The D.C. Circuit has subsequently followed the signal in BLE to repudiate the position it had set out in UAW v. Brock. See Crowley Caribbean Transport, Inc. v. Pefia, 37 F.3d 671,
677 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
35. The APA directs courts to review agency action for consistency with "law," 5 U.S.C.
§ 706, including agency-made law.
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decision as to whether an agency's refusal to institute proceedings
' '36
should be judicially reviewable.

Consider, for instance, the decision of the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals in National Wildlife Federationv. EPA. 37 There, the plaintiffs
asserted that the EPA could not refuse to initiate proceedings to with-

draw a state's primary enforcement responsibility for safe drinking
water, despite the resource questions implicated, after the EPA determined that excessive contaminants were present. 38 The court of appeals held that any agency failure to initiate such proceedings would
be reviewable under the APA because Congress had withheld such
discretion from the agency. 39 The EPA was compelled to take en-

forcement action upon finding specified contaminants in the water
40

supply.

Similarly, agencies, just as clearly as Congress, can signal their
intent to permit judicial review despite the resource allocation ques-

tions potentially involved. 4 ' As the D.C. Circuit summarized, "Just as
Congress can provide the basis for judicial review of nonenforcement
decisions by spelling out statutory factors to be measured by the
courts, so an agency can provide such factors by regulation .... fet-

ter[ing] its discretion ...."42 When agencies specify detailed factors in
rules or regulations, they may intend judges to enforce their commitment to a particular course of action.
But agencies do not intend many rules to be subject to third party
enforcement. Agencies promulgate internal management directives,
interpretative rules, and rules of agency procedure to guide the discretion of lower level officials, not necessarily to benefit third parties.
Indeed, although agencies presumably intend most legislative rules
adopted through notice and comment rulemaking 43 to benefit private
36. 470 U.S. at 838.
37. 980 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
38. See id. at 767-68.
39. See id. at 773-74; see also Davis Enters. v. EPA, 877 F.2d 1181, 1184-86 (3d Cir. 1989)
(suggesting that agency decisions otherwise unreviewable under the APA can be reviewed for
inconsistency with another statutory command).
40. See National Wildlife Fed'n, 980 F.2d at 768, 770.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696 (1974) (stating, "So long as [the]
regulation remains in force the Executive Branch is bound by it"); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S.
363, 388 (1957).
42. Center for Auto Safety v. Dole, 846 F.2d 1532, 1534 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The D.C. Circuit,
at least, has stated that agencies can bind themselves as well through internal policies. See Clifford v. Pefia, 77 F.3d 1414, 1417 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir.
1987); cf. Massachusetts Pub. Interest Group, Inc. v. NRC, 852 F.2d 9, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1988)
(suggesting that courts should not be able to review agency departures from internal policies if
the area is otherwise committed by law to agency discretion).
43. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
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parties, some provisions address only internal agency practice. Predicating review on inconsistency with rules or policies not intended to
benefit private parties could significantly limit the areas of unreviewability marked out in Chaney and Vigil.
For example, in Cardoza v. CFTC,4 4 plaintiff challenged the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC")'s failure to review a disciplinary action imposed by the Board of Trade of the City
of Chicago. The statutory scheme left the issue of when to review a
disciplinary action undertaken by a member exchange to the judgment
of the agency. 45 Yet the court concluded in part that the CFTC itself
had furnished sufficient standards with which to assess the agency's
decision whether to review a disciplinary action meted out by the
member exchange. 46 The agency had promulgated a regulation to
guide its consideration of such challenges:
The determination to review any exchange disciplinary or other
adverse action is a matter committed to the Commission's discretion. In determining whether to grant or deny review of any exchange disciplinary or other adverse action, the Commission may
consider such factors as
(a): Whether the issues presented involve an important policy
under the Act;
(b) The extent to which a review proceeding would interfere
with the efficient disposition of other Commission business;
(c) The precedential value of a Commission decision on the issues presented;
(d) Whether there is substantial divergence among the exchanges in their treatment of similar matters;
(f) Any other factors which the Commission deems relevant. 47
The court explained that "[iut is not significant in our view that
the regulation does not expressly require the Commission to consider
8
these factors, but instead states that it 'may' consider them. 4
Rather, the court continued, "the use of such discretionary language
in a regulation [should not] exempt an agency from its obligation to
follow its rules or policies upon which the public justifiably has come
44. 768 F.2d 1542 (7th Cir. 1985).
45. See id. at 1547 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 12c (1994): "The Commission may, in its discretion
and in accordance with such standards and procedures as it deems appropriate, review any decision by an exchange ... .
46. See id. at 1550.
47. Rules Relating to Review of Exchange Disciplinary or Other Adverse Action, 43 Fed.
Reg. 59,350, 59,352 (1978) (formerly codified at 17 C.F.R. § 9.30).
48. Cardoza, 768 F.2d at 1550.
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to rely." 4 9 The court concluded that "an aggrieved party could make a
strong showing on the applicability of the.., factors,
advisory though
'50
they may be, to indicate an abuse of discretion.
The recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in Clifford v. Peha51 is similar. There, three labor unions
challenged the Maritime Administration's grant of a waiver under the

Merchant Marine Act to a domestic carrier, permitting that carrier to
use six foreign-built vessels flying under foreign flag in its international shipping operations. 52 Congress had granted the agency wide
discretion in considering a waiver request: "Under special circum-

stances and for good cause shown, the Secretary of Transportation
may, in his discretion, waive" the applicable requirements. 53 The

court acknowledged that the words of the statute "appear unrestricted
and undefined."'54 Nonetheless, as in Cardoza,the court found law to
apply because the agency over the years had listed factors to guide its
own discretion. 55 The agency, for instance, had previously enumerated six factors that "should be considered" in determining whether to

grant a waiver. 56 Consequently, the court reasoned that "[t]he
agency's policies have thus provided standards rendering what might

arguably be unreviewable agency action reviewable. '' 57 Accordingly,

58
the court reviewed under the APA the agency's grant of the waiver.

49. Id.
50. Id. On the merits, the Court sided with the agency and held that its failure to review the
disciplinary determination was not arbitrary and capricious. See id. at 1552-53; cf.Morton v.
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974) (overturning agency action in part because the agency had failed
to comply with an informal rule detailing internal procedures that agency was to follow).
51. 77 F.3d 1414 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
52. See id. at 1415.
53. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1222(b) (1994).
54. Clifford, 77 F.3d at 1417.
55. See id.
56. See Certain Bulk Operators, 25 Shipping Reg. (P & F) 1261, 1264 (Mar. Admin. 1990).
The six factors are:
(1) whether the proposed foreign-flag vessel will not adversely affect subsidy payments
or the subsidized service; (2) whether the applicants would suffer hardship if the prohibition were enforced; (3) whether the proposed vessel use will have an insignificant
effect on American-flag service; (4) whether ownership or operation of the vessels
under United States registry by citizens is not practicable; (5) whether there is an insufficiency of American-flag vessels of the right type to serve the purpose; and (6) whether
the requested waivers are otherwise justified by any other special circumstance and
good cause.
Id.
57. Clifford, 77 F.3d at 1417.
58. The court concluded that the agency's waiver was justified in light of changed economic
conditions. See id. at 1417-18.
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Consider, as well, the Sixth Circuit's decision in Diebold v. United
States.59 There, civilian employees of the Army challenged under the

APA the Army's decision to contract out food service operations at
Fort Knox, thereby eliminating a number of jobs. 60 The government
responded by arguing that its decision whether to contract out food
operations was committed by law to the Army's discretion. 61 The

court acknowledged the matrix of decisionmaking that typically underlies the decision whether to contract out, and it recognized that

cost comparisons can be undertaken in myriad ways. 62 The court also
noted that other courts had previously held the contracting-out decision to be unreviewable. 63 Nevertheless, the court found law to apply,
principally in the terms of Office of Budget and Management Circular
A-76, which directs agencies through several steps to determine
whether contracting out goods and services will save the public

money.64 Regulations governing military procurement incorporated
the Circular. 65 The court explained that "[n]one of [the regulatory
requirements is] discretionary, and it all appears to be measurable....
[T]hese regulations provide standards by which to judge an agency's

contracting-out decision.

' 66

Because of the regulations, the court con-

cluded that it could review what otherwise would be unreviewable
agency action. 67 Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the dis-

trict court to permit plaintiffs to pursue their claim that the agency's
departure from the cost comparisons required by the Circular was ar68
bitrary and capricious under the APA.
59. 947 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1991).
60. See id. at 789.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 798-99, 807-08; see also id. at 816 (Wellford, J., dissenting) ("[Pilaintiffs' counsel conceded that cost calculations made by the agency are not reviewable, and that methods of
calculation chosen by the agency are within the agency's discretion.").
63. See id. at 798.
64. See id. at 801.
65. See id. at 794.
66. Id. at 798.
67. See id. at 810-11.
68. See id. at 811. Moreover, in Arnow v. NRC, 868 F.2d 223, 225 (7th Cir. 1989), Illinois
citizens sought review of the NRC's order refusing to suspend operation of certain nuclear
power plants pending testing for safety. Petitioners asserted in part that review was appropriate
in light of regulations enacted by the NRC, committing the agency to suspend operations of a
nuclear facility if certain safety hazards existed. See id. One pertinent regulation specified that
"the Director of Nuclear Reactor Commission ... may institute a proceeding to modify, suspend, or revoke a license ... as may be proper." 10 C.F.R. § 2.202 (1997). Although the court
ultimately upheld the agency's position, it found the agency's refusal to institute such proceedings reviewable in part, on the ground that Chaney did not apply when the agency's failure to act
is inconsistent with its own regulations. See Arnow, 868 F.2d at 234. The court stated that
"agency regulations can 'provide a sufficient standard for meaningful review."' Id. (quoting
Massachusetts Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. NRC, 852 F.2d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 1988)). It
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Interestingly, Cardoza, Clifford, and Diebold seemingly overlook
that the plaintiffs in Chaney alleged that the agency's failure to en-

force was arbitrary and capricious because agency officials departed
from prior agency policy. The agency in Chaney had issued a policy

statement that "obligated it to investigate" the unapproved use of an
approved drug when such use became "widespread" or "endanger[ed]
public health. '"69 Agency officials.may well have considered the policy

binding, 70 but the Supreme Court noted that "[w]e would have difficulty with this statement's vague language even if it were a properly
adopted agency rule."'7 1 Not every policy statement listing factors to
consider should open the agency to review. The Court in Chaney concluded that the policy statement, particularly because it seemingly
conflicted with a more official agency position, would not "provide

courts with adequate guidelines for informed judicial review of deci72
sions not to enforce."
The presence of a prior rule as in Chaney, therefore, should not
guarantee sufficient standards for review. For instance, in MadisonHughes v. Shalala,73 the plaintiffs alleged that health providers funded

by the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") discrimi-

nated on the basis of race. 74 Although the plaintiffs implicitly recognized that nonenforcement actions were generally nonreviewable,
they asserted that HHS failed to comply with mandatory federal regulations governing Title V1 75 that require HHS to collect data and information from providers receiving federal assistance. 76 Accordingly,

they argued that the agency's data collection practices were reviewcontinued that once an agency imposes standards on itself, it cannot "proceed without regard to
them." Id. (quoting Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388 (1957)); see also California Human Dev.
Corp. v. Brock, 762 F.2d 1044, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (asserting that the power to review the
Department of Labor's method for allocating funds under the Job Training Partnership Act was
in part based upon an agency regulation providing that funds "shall be allocated ... using the
best data available .. . as determined by the Department"); Schneider Nat'l, Inc. v. ICC, 948
F.2d 338, 343 (7th Cir. 1991); Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Baldrige, 827
F.2d 1353, 1361 (9th Cir. 1987); CC Distributors, Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 146, 154 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); Hill v. Group Three Hous. Dev. Corp. 799 F.2d 385, 394-95 (8th Cir. 1986).
69. Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503, 16,504 (1972); see also Chaney, 470 U.S. at 826.
70. See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 826 (stating that the lower court held that the FDA considered
the policy binding).
71. Id. at 836.
72. Id.; see also id. at 837-38.
73. 80 F.3d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1996).
74. See id. at 1123.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
76. See Madison-Hughes, 80 F.3d at 1125-27.
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able. 77 One of the regulations directed the agency to "provide for the
collection of data and information from applicants for and recipients

of federal assistance sufficient to permit effective enforcement of title
VI."' 78 The court held the claim of inconsistency with the regulation
inadequate. 79 The court reasoned that the regulation imposed no specific legal duty and held that, even if the regulation could be considered mandatory, it would still deny review because the regulation
itself was committed to agency discretion by law.8 0 Courts, in other
words, should not second-guess the adequacy of discretionary agency
action-in this case HHS's data collection-merely because a prior
81
regulation contemplates that some agency action take place.

But, in contrast, the Cardoza,Clifford, and Diebold courts seized
upon the prior existence of relatively open-ended agency pronounce-

ments to justify review. In their view, if regulations or policies exist,
judges can perform a traditional role of assessing agency action
against the benchmark of a preexisting legal standard of conduct.

Courts, therefore, have scrutinized agency conduct to ensure conformance not only with rules that have the force and effect of law, but also
with internal agency rules of guidance and procedure. Thus, even if

the agency's action is otherwise unreviewable, courts have not hesitated to step in if they can review agency action by determining
whether the action is consistent with prior agency policies. To ensure
that agencies respect the rule of law, courts intervene where they
otherwise would defer to agency discretion.
B.

Discretionary Function Exception

Congress waived much of the federal government's tort immunity
under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") in 1946.82 The Act subjects the waiver to numerous conditions 83 and exceptions, excluding
77. See id. at 1124.
78. 28 C.F.R. § 42.406(a) (1996).
79. See Madison-Hughes, 80 F.3d at 1130.
80. See id. at 1127-28.
81. Similarly, in Arnow v. NRC, 868 F.2d 223, 235-36 (7th Cir. 1989), the court concluded
that the regulatory language empowering the agency to suspend operation of a nuclear power
plant-"as may be proper"-did not commit the agency to any particular course of action, and
that the agency's action should not be set aside. See also Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 100
(D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Pronouncements that impose no significant restraints on the agency's discretion are not regarded as binding norms.").
82. Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1994)).
83. For instance, all claims must first be presented to an agency, see 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1994),
and the government is not liable for punitive damages. See id. § 2674. Moreover, there is no
right to a jury trial for such claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1994).
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for instance, liability arising out of combatant activities, 84 or from regulation of the monetary system. 85 To some extent, such exceptions
protect the government from large claims against the public fisc. For
example, claims for damages due to negligent Treasury operations
could be astronomical. But the exceptions also reflect a judgment that
courts are ill-equipped to second-guess certain discretionary agency
conduct, such as the judgment of military officials engaged in combat
and that of Treasury officials adjusting fiscal policy.
To safeguard agency action further, the FTCA includes one catchall exception applicable to every agency. The discretionary function
exception precludes all claims "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. '86 The exception aims to safeguard a certain type of agency action from judicial
second-guessing, although the character of the action is left unspecified. Not surprisingly, courts have struggled to devise tests for deter87
mining what type of discretion to protect.
Instead of focusing on the identity of the agency decisionmaker
or whether the agency decision was reached at the planning or operation level, the Court in the 1980s focused on the type of agency action
involved. In United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense (Varig Airlines)88 the Court stressed the exception's purpose "to prevent judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy
through the medium of an action in tort."' 89 In Varig itself, the Court
barred the plaintiffs' challenge to the Federal Aviation Administration's decision to monitor compliance with safety regulations through
a spot-check system. 90 The decision to implement that system reflected a compromise between goals of safety and conserving re92
sources. 91 Checking every plane would be too costly.
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 26800).
85. See id. § 2680(i).
86. See id. § 2680(a).
87. For the history of the Supreme Court's doctrine in this context, see Harold J. Krent,
PreservingDiscretion Without Sacrificing Deterrence: Federal Governmental Liability in Tort, 38
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 871, 878-84 (1991).
88. 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
89. See id. at 814.
90. See id. at 820-21.
91. See id. at 820.
92. See id.
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Much like the committed to agency discretion by law provision in
the APA, the discretionary function exception sets aside one type of
agency action as off limits to the judiciary. Reviewing some agency
actions, particularly through the medium of a tort action, could
threaten agency policymaking just as in the APA context. Judges
could influence agencies by determining which type of agency actions
are reasonable, and which are not. The standard of negligence is loose

enough to permit judges to reach a wide range of results. Agencies
would likely respond by adjusting their conduct to conform to judges'
expected views of reasonableness. The costs and course of agency action might accordingly change.
Of course, there is no bright-line demarcation between areas in
which judicial review would be worth the potential costs and those in

which they would not. Questions remain as to whether "technical" or

"professional" discretion falls within the exception 93 and whether all

agency decisions bearing on an agency's finances constitute the type of
economic policy shielded under the Act. 94 Nonetheless, much as in
Chaney and Lincoln, the Court has developed a common law approach to unreviewability based on the type of policy underlying the
challenged agency action.

Moreover, there are three reasons for particular concern over judicial review in the torts context. First, the FTCA specifies that negligence is to be assessed under state law. 95 The state law standard-

applied by federal judges-exposes agencies to inconsistent judgments
across the states. For instance, California may have deemed the
FAA's spot-check policy negligent, but other states may have adopted
less demanding standards to encourage good Samaritans.

Second, review of administrative conduct in a tort suit is likely to
be biased due to the presence of a concrete injury, which may predis93. Compare In re Glacier Bay, 71 F.3d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that scientific
judgment was not protected as policy), and Ayala v. United States, 980 F.2d 1342, 1349-50 (10th
Cir. 1992) ("We fail to see how the determination in this case can be labeled r policy decision.
The choice was governed, as plaintiffs contend, by 'objective principles of electrical engineering."'), with Ayer v. United States, 902 F.2d 1038, 1043-44 (1st Cir. 1990) (technical judgment
protected).
94. See, e.g., Cope v. Scott, 45 F.3d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (rejecting exception's applicability in context of a failure to warn of dangerous road conditions, noting that "[t]he mere presence of choice--even if that choice involves whether money should be spent-does not trigger
the exception"); Arizona Maintenance Co. v. United States, 864 F.2d 1497, 1504 (9th Cir. 1989)
("Clearly a decision to use the cheapest and easiest method in contravention of safety standards
could not be a protected discretionary function .... ").
95. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 ("The United States shall be liable.., in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.").
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pose the decisionmaker to finding the action wrongful. Review cannot proceed as in the more detached context of an APA suit.96
Third, the prospect of a damages award may furnish the agency
even more incentive to cater to judicial attitudes than the prospect of
an APA suit. If a court finds a challenged rule arbitrary or capricious,
the agency retains the discretion to fashion the policy anew, perhaps
even to choose the same policy buttressed merely with a different justification. The threat of a damages award, however, might deter a risk
averse or even rational agency from experimenting with policies that
conceivably expose it to liability. Indeed, the prospect of damages
might lead agency officials to become overly cautious in carrying out
governmental responsibilities. Agency officials might wrap themselves in paper work as a means of insulating the government from
97
liability.
Just as in the APA context, however, courts hold otherwise unreviewable agency action reviewable if the agency acts inconsistently
with one of its own rules. In Berkovitz v. United States,98 the plaintiff
asserted that he contracted polio after receiving a vaccine approved
by the National Institutes of Health's Division of Biologic Standards. 99 He alleged that the Institute failed to obtain certain information from the manufacturer as required by the regulatory scheme,
prior to issuing a license. 1°° The Court held that "[w]hen a suit
charges an agency with failing to act in accord with a specific
mandatory directive, the discretionary function exception does not apply."101 No discretion exists, according to the Court, if a previously
established policy limits the employee's choice: "[T]he employee has
'10 2
no rightful option but to adhere to the directive.
96. See Ronald A. Cass, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS: 1987,
at 1503, 1519 (1987).
97. The Food and Drug Administration, for example, might fail to evaluate new drugs expeditiously for fear of incurring governmental tort liability, even though the public as a whole may
suffer from the delay. See id. at 1522. On the other hand, the FTCA more noticeably serves a
compensation function than does the APA, thus suggesting that judicial oversight may be more
important. Yet agency actions challenged under the APA can injure individuals as well, and
review may be as needed in that context to prevent unfairness.
98. 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
99. See id. at 533.
100. See id. at 542. Both the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 262(d) (1994), and implementing regulations, 42 C.F.R. § 73.3 (now codified at 21 C.F.R. § 601.2 (1997)), provided that the agency must
receive certain data from the manufacturers prior to issuing a license. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at
542.
101. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 544.
102. Id. at 536; see also Bruce A. Peterson & Mark E. Van Der Weide, Susceptible to Faulty
Analysis: United States v. Gaubert and the Resurrection of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 72 No-
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Courts of appeals have construed the "specific mandatory direc-

tive" language in Berkovitz quite liberally, applying the reasoning in
Berkovitz to reject the government's discretionary function exception
defense in many contexts. For instance, consider the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Faber v. United States.10 3 There, plaintiff sued the United

States Forest Service for failing to warn of the danger in diving from
atop a falls in a national park. 10 4 The court noted that, in general, the
failure to warn of hazards in a national park is a discretionary act involving questions of access to the park, agency resources, and likelihood of danger.' 0 5 In 1986, however, an internal park management
plan resolved to convey warnings to users of the falls, noting that
seven percent of all accidents in the park arose due to diving at the

falls. 106 When the plaintiff was injured in 1991, no signs had ever been7
10
constructed, and park rangers failed to warn the plaintiff verbally.

Accordingly, the court concluded that the discretionary function exception did not apply because the park service had ignored the find08
ings in the internal management plan.

Similarly, in Irving v. United States,10 9 the Court of Appeals for

the First Circuit held that the discretionary function exception might
not bar a FTCA claim based upon the failure of inspectors from the
TRE DAmE L. REV. 447, 494 (1997) (defending Berkovitz inquiry on the ground that agency
choice not to follow prior regulation is not the type of choice that should be protected by the
discretionary function exception); Scott D. Barash, Comment, The DiscretionaryFunction Exception and Mandatory Regulations, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1300, 1327 (1987) ("[T]he judiciary has
always sought to hold the executive to its own declared policies; rule of law concerns have long
supported judicial review of executive action.").
103. 56 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 1995).
104. See id. at 1123.
105. See id. at 1124-25; cf. Grammatico v. United States, 109 F.3d 1198, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997)
(holding that Department of Defense's failure to warn of dangerous conditions of surplus property sold to the public at auction reflected balancing of economics and safety that should not be
second-guessed by courts).
106. See Faber,56 F.3d at 1123-24.
107. See id. at 1124.
108. See id. at 1127-28; see also In re Glacier Bay, 71 F.3d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1995) (reaching
a negligence claim arising from the failure of hydrographers to follow requirements in a fifteenyear-old agency manual); Appley Bros. v. United States, 7 F.3d 720, 721 (8th Cir. 1993) (addressing a negligence claim arising from the failure to follow a United States Department of Agriculture policy in checking shortages at a grain warehouse); Tinkler v. United States, 982 F.2d 1456,
1464 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that the FAA violated provisions of its Flight Services Manual
regarding weather reports); Phillips v. United States, 956 F.2d 1071, 1076-77 (11th Cir. 1992)
(holding that the breach of a mandatory directive that the Army Corps of Engineers perform
field safety inspections every time it visits a construction site may violate the FTCA); Sumner v.
United States, 794 F. Supp. 1358, 1367 (M.D. Tenn. 1992) (holding that the Army violated an
internal regulation requiring that it warn the public of areas used for target practice); Santa Fe
Pac. Realty Corp. v. United States, 780 F. Supp. 687, 698 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that agency
sold hazardous materials without alerting buyers of special handling requirements as required by
agency policies).
109. 49 F.3d 830 (1st Cir. 1995).
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Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") to note
the dangerous condition of a particular die-out machine. 110 The court

acknowledged that neither statute nor regulation required the inspector to inspect each machine." 1 Nonetheless, the court held that plaintiff was entitled to discovery to ascertain whether OSHA policy in
practice permitted individual inspectors the discretion as to how to

conduct each inspection and which violation to report.11 2 Courts accordingly have applied the Berkovitz limitation of the discretionary
function exception to cover informal as well as formal agency policy.

Indeed, half of the discretionary function exception claims that the
government has recently lost can be attributed to the agency's failure
1 13
to follow prior policy.

Thus, as under the APA, agency action that is otherwise unreviewable becomes reviewable if the agency's discretion is limited by
preexisting agency rules, including those rules that do not have the
force and effect of law. Although the agency retains the discretion
whether to enact rules, once formulated the rules permit judicial over-

sight to the extent that judges can consider the rules in evaluating the
agency's subsequent conduct. Judges can determine whether the
agency has acted consistently with such rules without interfering with
sensitive questions of budgetary allocations or political priorities with
which judges are presumably not as adept as agencies. Courts can
ascertain whether the agency's conduct comported with preexisting
standards without arrogating to themselves the agencies' policymaking function.
Finally, even if judges find that the agency has acted inconsistently with the previous rules, courts might subsequently find the conduct not to be negligent. To my knowledge courts have never so held,

but in rare cases they might find departures from preexisting standards to be warranted. New information or an unforeseen situation
might justify the decision not to follow the prior rule. 114 Enforcement
110. See id. at 831-32.
111. See id. at 834. Indeed, in United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense
(Varig Airlines), the Court had shielded the agency's decision as to how best to fulfill its mission
of promoting airline safety-whether by inspecting each plane, spot checking, or whatever. See
467 U.S. 797, 819-20 (1994); see also supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
112. See Irving, 49 F.3d at 835. On remand the district court determined that the discretionary function exception did not apply because the evidently unwritten OSHA policy mandated
that every machine be checked. See Irving v. United States, 942 F. Supp. 1483, 1496-1502
(D.N.H. 1996).
113. See Peterson & Van Der Weide, supra note 102, at 466.
114. Cf. Collins v. United States, 783 F.2d 1225, 1230-31 (5th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that
government officials should be able to depart from preexisting regulations in an emergency).
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1207

officials may knowingly violate internal rules of procedure, for instance, in order to prevent harm to the public, such as by seizing
adulterated drugs that otherwise would be introduced into commerce.
Or, the rule violated may have only an attenuated connection to the
allegedly negligent agency action. Consider if the Berkovitz plaintiffs
had alleged that the National Institutes of Health received information from the vaccine manufacturers after the time allotted by regulation had lapsed. The hypothetical delay in receiving the data in no
way should suggest that the agency ultimately failed to balance resource and social policy issues in determining whether to issue a license for the vaccine. Agencies need not automatically fear liability
when departing from preexisting rules, but the price is judicial review
and a likely finding of liability.
C. ProceduralDue Process
At first glance, procedural due process cases have little in common with cases brought under the APA and FTFCA. Unlike in the
APA and FTCA contexts, the private parties challenging agency action object to the procedures followed by the agency as well as the
substance of the agency's decision. Moreover, the private parties can
rely on the Constitution rather than a statute in challenging the
agency action.
Nonetheless, the Court's decisions in the due process area manifest a similar dynamic to that in the APA and FTCA contexts. The
Court generally has eschewed any role in determining the importance
of a regulatory benefit. Rather, that decision remains political. Congress and agencies are better positioned than the Court to determine
when regulated entities and individuals should receive particular
agency benefits and rights.
Once an agency has circumscribed its own authority, however,
then the Court will intervene by virtue of the Due Process Clause to
ensure that the agency affords sufficient process in granting or denying
such regulatory interests, whether they can be characterized as property or liberty. 115 The Due Process Clause protects interests in both
property and liberty created when agencies so limit their own discretion as to create a legitimate expectation of entitlement. The proce115. Liberty interests can also be derived from the Constitution itself. See, e.g., Washington
v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (recognizing a liberty interest to be free from the administration of antipsychotic medication).
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dural framework established by an agency is not dispositive. 116 The
Court will force the agency, whether state or federal, to adhere to federal due process guarantees if the agency first has sufficiently constrained its own flexibility.
The Supreme Court's decision in Perry v. Sindermann'1 7 provides
an apt illustration. Robert Sindermann taught in the Texas state college system from 1959 to 1969: "[H]e became a professor of Government and Social Science at Odessa Junior College in 1965 .... [and

subsequently worked] under a series of one-year contracts.1 118 When
the Board of Regents declined to renew his contract at the end of the
fourth one-year contract, he sued, alleging in part that the Board's
discharge violated his property interest in continued employment
within the system. 119 The Board offered him no official reasons for
the discharge, but issued a press release accusing him of insubordination. 120 The Board did not afford him a hearing to contest the accu121
racy of the charges.
To determine whether the plaintiff enjoyed a property interest in
employment, the Court first inquired whether he could claim any contractual security in continued employment. 122 Because he had only
entered into one-year contractual agreements, a property interest
would not normally arise. 123 In addition, plaintiff could not rely on
any statutory grant of tenure. 124 Neither the state legislature, nor the
contract, committed the Board of Regents to employ him for any
125
more than the one year promised in the contract.
Nonetheless, the Court held that plaintiff could demonstrate a
property interest by pointing to actions that the agencies-the college
administration and the Board of Regents-had taken. 126 Plaintiff alleged that the Odessa Junior College administration had distributed a
116. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (rejecting the bitter
with the sweet approach and thus preventing agencies from limiting the procedures attached to
entitlements).
117. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
118. Id. at 594.
119. See id. at 595. The plaintiff also alleged that his discharge was in retaliation for his
exercise of First Amendment rights. See id.
120. See id. Sindermann had criticized the Board of Regents in a series of disputes that year,
focusing in part on whether Odessa Junior College should have been changed into a four-year
institution. See id. at 594-95.
121. See id. at 595.
122. See id. at 599-602.
123. See id. at 598-99.
124. See id. at 599-600.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 602-03.
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Faculty Guide promising a type of tenure, and had encouraged faculty
members to rely on that guide. 127 Moreover, the Texas College and
University system as a whole had promulgated guidelines providing
that a faculty member who had been employed for seven years or
more had some form of job tenure. 128 Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether, under state
law, plaintiff enjoyed a property interest under either theory. 129
Although the Court will not itself determine whether an individual should enjoy a property interest in continuing government employment, it will intervene to protect property rights once an agency
creates a property interest by circumscribing its authority. Individuals
and firms may rely upon agency pledges or commitments as much as
they rely upon the more traditional forms of real property. In recognition of the importance that governmental programs and entitlements play in all of our lives, the Court has concluded that the Due
Process Clause should protect private parties from arbitrary governmental decisions depriving them of a governmental benefit even
though the decision whether to confer a benefit is preeminently political. Through the promulgation of rules or regulations, an agency can
create a property interest subject to the protections in the Due Process Clause.
The Supreme Court has held that agencies can create liberty as
130
well as property interests protected under the Due Process Clause.
The Court has stated that "the most common manner in which a State
creates a liberty interest is by establishing 'substantive predicates' to
govern official decision-making and, further, by mandating the outcome to be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been
met.' 131 In Board of Pardons v. Allen, 132 plaintiffs had alleged that
the mandatory language of Montana's parole release statute created a
liberty interest. 133 The Court recognized that it was poorly situated to
second-guess parole release decisions. 3 4 The parole release decision
127. See id. at 599-601.
128. See id. at 600.
129. See id. at 603. For commentary critiquing the Court's approach, see Rodney Smolla,
The Reemergence of the Right-PrivilegeDistinctionin ConstitutionalLaw: The Price of Protesting
Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV.69 (1982-83), and Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044 (1984).
130. The agency's decision to circumscribe its own authority now forms only one condition
precedent to creation of a liberty interest. See infra text accompanying notes 287-305.
131. Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462 (1989) (citation omitted)
(quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983)).
132. 482 U.S. 369 (1987).
133. See id. at 371.
134. See id. at 374-75.
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turned on a matrix of facts leading to a predictive judgment that could
135
not easily be reviewed by judges.
But the Court then continued that if the state, as in Sindermann,
removes an official's discretion by circumscribing the parole release
decision, a liberty interest can be created. 13 6 The Montana statute

then provided that "[s]ubject to the following restrictions, the board
shall release on parole . .. when in its opinion there is reasonable

probability that the prisoner can be released without detriment to the
prisoner or to the community.' 37 Because the Montana statute used
mandatory language, and because the statute limited the circumstances in which parole could be denied, the Court concluded that a
liberty interest had been created. 138 Courts have determined that the

language in other parole statutes sufficiently circumscribes the discre-

139
tion of parole authorities so as to create a liberty interest.
Not all mandatory language, however, gives rise to entitlements.
In Olim v. Wakinekona,140 administrative regulations for Hawaii pris-

ons required a hearing prior to prisoner transfers to out-of-state institutions. 141 The regulations were phrased in mandatory terms, and
plaintiff allegedly received a deficient hearing prior to his transfer to a
California prison thousands of miles away from family. 142 Had the
Court followed the entitlement analysis set forth in Sindermann, it
would have held that Hawaii had created a liberty interest protected
under the Due Process Clause, and required the state to afford plain-

tiff a full hearing (as specified in the regulations) prior to transfer.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 380-81.
137. ld. at 376 (quoting MONT.CODE ANN. § 46-23-201 (1985)).
138. See id. at 376-81. For a critique, see Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process Rights of Prisonersand Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv.
482 (1984); Timothy P. Terrell, Liberty: The Concept and its Constitutional Context, 1 NOTRE
DAME J.L. E-Hics & PUB.POL'Y 545 (1985).
139. See, e.g., Hamlin v. Vaudenberg, 95 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing a liberty
interest in good time credits). The Supreme Court in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995),
affirmed the parole line of cases, stating that it would continue to recognize liberty interests
"where the State's action will inevitably affect the duration of [the] sentence." See also Wilson v.
Kelkhoff, 86 F.3d 1438, 1446 n.9 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing liberty interest in parole after
Sandin).
Prior to Sandin, courts had found liberty interests in an array of other contexts. See, e.g.,
Harper v. Young, 64 F.3d 563, 566-67 (10th Cir. 1995) (recognizing liberty interest in pre-parole
supervision program), affd, 117 S. Ct. 1148 (1997); Browning v. Vernon, 44 F.3d 818, 821 (9th
Cir. 1995) (finding that the state created a liberty interest by providing the opportunity to participate in a special probation program); Layton v. Beyer, 953 F.2d 839, 846 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding a liberty interest in not being placed in protective custody); Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d
996, 1007 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding a liberty interest in a work release program).
140. 461 U.S. 238 (1983).
141. See id. at 242.
142. See id. at 241-43.
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But the Court held that no liberty interest had been created by the
regulations, despite the mandatory language. 14 3 Under the regula-

tions, the prison administrator retained the discretion to transfer prisoners irrespective of what transpired at the hearing. 144 In the Court's
view, no liberty interest had been created: "Process is not an end in
itself. Its constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to
which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement. ' 14 5 There
is no entitlement to procedure, and an agency's discretionary decision

need not be subject to judicial review even if mandatory procedural
requirements were violated. 1 46 The agency's departure from prior
regulations does not always trigger judicial scrutiny of the substance

47
of the agency's action, at least at the constitutional level.1
Thus, as in the APA and FTCA contexts, courts will review other-

wise unreviewable agency actions when the agency seemingly departs

from prior agency policy, in this case regulations that pledge a particular course of action involving either property or liberty interests.
Courts can ascertain whether the agency action comported with the
Due Process Clause without directly second-guessing the agency de-

termination whether to confer or limit an entitlement in the first
instance.
In general, therefore, courts have exercised judicial review over
otherwise unreviewable agency action when agencies have failed to

follow their own rules. At times, courts have inquired-as in Cardoza1 48 and Faber' 49-whether the agency action violated preexisting
policy even when that policy may not have been binding on agency
officials. Moreover, courts have reviewed agency action for inconsistency with prior rules despite the fact that the rules allegedly violated
were not intended primarily for the benefit of third parties. In Car143. See id. at 249.
144. See id,
145. Id. at 250.
146. See id. at 250-51.
147. Federalism concerns support this result. Unlike in the APA and FTCA contexts, due
process review often requires federal courts to second-guess acts by state and local governmental
officials. If every violation of state and local government law gave rise to a federal constitutional
violation, then federal courts would become the monitors of state officials' compliance with state
law, a task inviting friction between state and federal governments. See Davis v. Scherer, 468
U.S. 183, 195 (1984); see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700 (1976) (quoting Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 108-09 (1945)) ("'[v]iolation of local law does not necessarily mean that
federal rights have been invaded"'); Boveri v. Saugus, 113 F.3d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1997) ("A regulatory violation, like a violation of state law, is not inherently sufficient to support a § 1983
claim.").
148. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
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doza and Diebold,150 the rules rather were directed toward agency
personnel. To the courts, the need to ensure consistent administration
of the law outweighed any potential adverse impact on the agency's
implementation of a discretionary program.
Judicial review unquestionably may have benefits in the three
contexts considered. Although I discuss the attributes of judicial oversight more fully later, 15' some summary is appropriate here. First,
when agencies have limited their own discretion, review can help ensure that the agency treat similarly situated individuals equivalently, a
fundamental principle of public law. Review for consistency furthers
152
the ideal of agency legitimacy.
In addition, review for compliance with prior rules and regulations limits arbitrary governance. The potential for bias or vindictiveness is reduced. 153 At the same time, the appearance as well as the
reality (one hopes) of propriety is preserved. Disputes with government regulators often leave private parties frustrated and demoralized. The government's advantage in resources, in tandem with
labyrinthine regulations, may suggest that the playing field is not level.
Requiring administrators to follow their own rules thus may serve to
instill faith in government.
Moreover, individuals and firms may well have relied on the prior
agency law in structuring their affairs. Private parties may have
shaped deals or expended resources in reliance on government rules
and policies. Agencies honor the tremendous individual interest in
predictability when they keep their commitments. Thus, concerns
both for promoting rule of law values and respecting reliance interests
bolster the case for judicial review. Judicial review ensures that governmental programs, which affect many of our lives so fundamentally,
are administered in an evenhanded fashion.

II.

UNINTENDED IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

In the three contexts canvassed, courts have exercised review
over discretionary agency actions when the agency has limited its own
discretion. In the APA context, courts review otherwise unreviewable
150. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
151. See infra notes 250-58 and accompanying text.
152. See Rubin, supra note 129, at 1105 ("Nothing leaves a state agent as much room for
venality, hatred, caprice, or carelessness as the power to ignore the applicable rules."); see also
Yoav Dotan, Why Administrators Should be Bound by Their Policies, 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 23, 25-31 (1997) (arguing that agencies should be bound to follow their own policies).
153. See Dotan, supra note 152, at 29-30.
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action to promote consistency with previously articulated rules. In
FTCA cases, courts exercise review to assess the reasonableness of the
agency's action, taking into account the agency's departure from preexisting rules and regulations. In due process cases, courts inquire
whether the agency has circumscribed its discretion sufficiently to create a legitimate expectation of an entitlement. The assertion of judicial review in the three contexts is based, at least in part, on the ability
of courts to monitor agency action without second-guessing the
agency's discretionary judgments as to enforcement or political priorities. The premise is shaky, and review ultimately may prove
counterproductive.
The impact of review has been most noted in the due process
context. Requiring hearings can be an expensive business; so much so
that the resources devoted to the governmental program must be redirected from intended beneficiaries to staffing hearings. 154 Moreover,
the agency may alter eligibility criteria to simplify the issues to be resolved at the hearing 155 or may seek to limit the entitlement itself in
light of budget concerns.
But there are significant costs even aside from potentially timeconsuming hearings. Review likely results in similar consequences in
all three contexts. First, the courts' doctrine provides an incentive to
agencies to create as few clear rules as possible. The fewer and murkier the rules, the less likely that the agency will be saddled with liability from a tort judgment, with review of otherwise unreviewable
actions under the APA, or with the need to provide hearings because
it has created a regulatory entitlement. Second, review-as a theoretical matter-impedes agencies' ability to modify or disregard prior directives because the courts have signaled that change can only come if
particular procedures are followed. Third, judges may misconstrue
the nature of the prior rule and thereby impair the agency's efforts to
fashion effective policy.
A.

Incentives to Formulate Rules

Judicial review to force agencies to adhere to previously fashioned rules will unquestionably discourage agencies from articulating
154. See Richard A. Epstein, No New Property, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 747, 767-68 (1990); see
generally Symposium, The Legacy of Goldberg v. Kelly: A Twenty Year Perspective, 56 BROOK.
L. REV. 729 (1990).
155. For sophisticated analyses, see JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985) and DANIEL J. BAUM, THE WELFARE FAMILY AND MASS ADMINISTRATIVE
JUSTICE (1974).
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rules or policies in the first instance. Such review triggers an activitylevel effect, altering the amount and nature of subsequent policymak-

ing. The magnitude of the disincentive remains in question: agencies
have numerous reasons to formulate policy despite the risk that they

open themselves to judicial review. For instance, senior agency officials may wish to circumscribe the discretion of subordinate agency
officials, and clear rules may help current administrators exert influence over their successors in office. Nonetheless, at least at the margin, judicial review to ensure compliance with previously articulated
rules and regulations brings with it a cost, and agencies are not immune from such considerations when deciding what type of rules to
formulate.
Numerous studies have demonstrated agency sensitivity to judicial review. 156 Commentators have sketched both beneficial and dele-

terious effects flowing from the potential for review, depending upon
both context and commentator. Judicial review has sharpened agency
analysis and, on occasion, rectified gross errors. 15 7 On the other hand,

the prospect of review has prompted agencies to devote considerable
time and resources into papering the record to withstand review.
Even when compiling extensive rulemaking records, agencies lose a
158
substantial portion of cases when the rules are challenged in court.

The National Highway Transportation Safety Administration, for instance, arguably shifted resources from rulemaking to recalls in an effort to avoid problematic judicial review in the former context. 159 The
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission formulated policy through li-

cense proceedings, as opposed to rulemaking, in part to circumvent
156. For a sampling of leading views, see JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE
AUTO SAFETY (1990), R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE
CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (1983), JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF Toxic SUBSTANCE REGULATION: How OVERREGULATION CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA (1988),
Barry Boyer, The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Protection Policy: A Postmortem
Examination, in MAKING REGULATORY POLICY 93 (Keith Hawkins & John Thomas eds. 1989),
Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of "Hiding the Ball": NLRB Policymaking and the Failureof
Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REV. 387 (1995), Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of
JudicialReview of Agency Rules: How FederalCourts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisisof
the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1991), Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting
OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1989).
157. For a sampling of contexts, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION
160-92 (1990).
158. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process,
1992 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992).
159. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 156, at 147-71; see also Terence M. Scanlon & RobSTRUGGLE FOR

ert A. Rogowsky, Back Door Rulemaking:A View from the CPSC, REGULATION, Jul.-Aug. 1984,
at 27.
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review in the rulemaking context. 160 On balance, the legacy of recent
judicial review of rulemaking is mixed, and one byproduct is fewer
rules. It should not be surprising, therefore, that agencies may hesitate to bind themselves with rules when one of the consequences is
judicial review, with the attendant costs in terms of financial expense
and judicial errors.
No definitive empirical study is possible. There are myriad reasons to explain why agencies have formulated fewer or more discretionary rules. Resources may become tight, or political priorities
change. Isolating the impact of judicial review is therefore quite
difficult.
Nonetheless, some understanding of the impact on agencies can
be gleaned from considering agency reaction to judicial decisions in
the 1970s and 1980s holding that mandatory language in parole statutes and regulations gives rise to a protected liberty interest.
The Supreme Court first addressed the parole context in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and CorrectionalComplex. 16' The
Court initially asserted that "[t]here is no constitutional or inherent
right of a convicted persdn to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.' 62 Indeed, the Court continued that the
parole determination is not easily subject to judicial review because it
"involves a synthesis of record facts and personal observation filtered
through the experience of the decisionmaker .... ,,163 The Court recognized that "[i]f parole determinations are encumbered by procedures that states regard as burdensome and unwarranted, they may
abandon or curtail parole."'1 64 Nevertheless, the Court stated that
statutory and regulatory language can create an "expectancy of re' 165
lease . . . entitled to some measure of constitutional protection,"
opening the agency to due process review. Within ten years, the
Court reiterated in Board of Pardons v. Allen 166 that the mandatory
language in a parole release statute could, and in fact had, created a
liberty interest. 67 Recognizing a liberty interest led to the requirement of hearings and to ex post review by judges to ensure that the
160. See Jim Rossi, Reexamining JudicialReview: The Hard Look Doctrine and FederalRegulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 763, 804-06.
161. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
162. Id. at 7.
163. Id. at 8.
164. Id. at 13.
165. Id. at 12.
166. 482 U.S. 369 (1987).
167. See id. at 381.
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previously promulgated parole criteria were applied in a consistent
16 8

manner.
State legislatures and administrative officials reacted. In addition

to Nebraska and Montana, at least ten other jurisdictions had previously enacted traditional parole statutes or regulations that arguably
were phrased in mandatory terms.16 9 The mandatory language, in

conjunction with the structure of the parole statutes, gave rise to the
possibility that courts would conclude that a liberty interest had been

created. And, in several of the jurisdictions, courts so found. 170 Out

of those twelve jurisdictions, six legislative or administrative bodies
amended rules after Greenholtz to minimize the possibility of creating
a liberty interest, including the Montana legislature which amended

the statute to bypass the Court's ruling in Allen.171
The response of Georgia is illustrative. Under the regulatory system, the Board of Pardons and Parole had promulgated a Georgia

Parole Decision Guidelines System, setting forth a step-by-step system
to evaluate whether an inmate was entitled to parole. 172 The Board
assigned an inmate a crime severity level, and a parole success likelihood score. 17 3 Based on a combination of the two, the Board then
established a target release date. 174 The parole statute directed that
the "guidelines system shall be used in determining parole actions on
168. See id.
169. See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-40 (1997); 9 GUAM CODE ANN. § 80.72 (1992); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 549.261 (1978) (repealed 1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.51(a)-(i) (1997); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 13-8-14 (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 501(a) (1996); W. VA. CODE § 62-12-13(d)

Supp. 1997); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 28, §§ 204.19-.20 (prior to 1994 amendment) (discussed in
Ellis v. District of Columbia, 84 F.3d 1413, 1416 (D.C. Cir 1996)); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20,

§ 1610.20 (1985) (section repealed 1985); TENN. CoMp. R. & REGS. Ch. 1100-1-1-.06 (prior to
1985 amendment) (discussed in Wright v. Trammel, 810 F.2d 589, 591 (6th Cir. 1987)).
170. See Bermudez v. Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1991) (Guam); Mayes v. Trammell, 751 F.2d 175, 179 (6th Cir. 1984) (Tennessee); United States ex reL Scott v. Illinois Parole &
Pardon Bd., 669 F.2d 1185, 1192 (7th Cir. 1982); Williams v. Missouri Bd. of Probation & Parole,
661 F.2d 697, 698 (8th Cir. 1981); Watson v. DiSabato, 933 F. Supp. 390, 395 (D.N.J. 1996);
Petrarca v. Rhode Island, 583 F. Supp. 297, 301 (D.R.I. 1984); Tasker v. Mohn, 267 S.E.2d 183,
198 (W. Va. 1980).
171. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 217.690 (West 1996) (adopted 1982); Mor. CODE ANN. § 46-23201 (1996) (amended in 1989); D.C. MUN. REGs. tit. 28, §§ 204.19-.20 (1997) (amended in 1994);
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 1610.50 (1996) (adopted 1985); TENN. CoMp. R. & REGS. Ch. 1100-1-

1-.06 (1986) (amended in 1985); Sultenfuss v. Snow, 35 F.3d 1494, 1496-97, 1497 n.2 (11th Cir.
1994) (en banc) (discussing Georgia Parole Decision Guidelines System which mentions Greenholtz in a notice affirming the parole board's discretion not to grant parole); see also Wright, 810
F.2d at 591 (discussing Tennessee rules changes).
172. See Sultenfuss, 35 F.3d at 1495 (discussing the Georgia Parole Decision Guidelines
System).
173. See id. at 1497.
174. See id.
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all inmates.' 1 7 5 Nonetheless, the Board added a "notice" to its guidelines to make its intent clear:
THE BOARD SPECIFICALLY RESERVES THE RIGHT TO
EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION UNDER GEORGIA LAW TO
DENY PAROLE EVEN THOUGH GUIDELINES CRITERIA
ARE MET BY AN INMATE. IT IS NOT THE INTENTION OF
THE BOARD TO CREATE A "LIBERTY INTEREST" OF THE
TYPE DESCRIBED IN GREENHOLTZ V. NEBRASKA PENAL INMATES 442 US 1 (1979).176

The Board's action may have been inconsistent with the legislature's
intent. The en banc court of appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, how177
ever, concluded that no liberty interest was created.
The changes made by the District of Columbia present another
context. Under a complicated point system, D.C. regulations provided that certain adult and youth offenders "shall" be granted pa1 79
role. 178 The city council subsequently replaced "shall" with "may."'
More significantly, the council rescinded two appendices that had
guided officials in determining an offender's suitability for parole.1 8 0
Legislatures and agencies have acted to ensure that liberty interests are not created in other contexts as well, whether work release
programs or prison transfers. 18 1 Moreover, with respect to property
rights, countless municipalities and school boards presumably have altered practices to minimize the protections that employees receive to
avoid any finding of a property interest. 182 School board officials, for
175.

GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-40.

176. See Sultenfuss, 35 F.3d at 1503 (quoting Parole Guidelines System, Annexure 2).
177. See id. at 1500-03.
178. See Ellis v. District of Columbia, 84 F.3d 1413, 1415-16 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (summarizing
the D.C. parole regulations).
179. See Technical Amendments Act of 1994, D.C. Act 10-302, § 52(c)-(e), 41 D.C. REG.
5193, 5203 (1994) (codified as amended at D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 28, § 204.19-.21); see also Ellis,
84 F.3d at 1417 n.4.
180. See § 52(f), 41 D.C. REG. at 5203 (repealing appendices); Ellis, 84 F.3d at 1415-16
(describing appendices).
181. See generally Anyon v. Mach, No. 93-1787, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31950, at *4-5 (1st
Cir. Dec. 9, 1993) (holding that when state revised a short term release program for patients
confined to the Massachusetts Treatment Center for Sexually Dangerous Persons, it extinguished a possible liberty interest in release); Tracy v. Salamack, 572 F.2d 393, 394-96 (2d Cir.
1978) (finding that state altered transition program for prisoners in a way that extinguished the
underlying entitlement); Harrison v. Raney, 837 F. Supp. 875, 879-81 (W.D. Tenn. 1993) (involving Tennessee agency that changed regulation so as not to create liberty interest in place of
incarceration); cf. Young v. Harper, 117 S. Ct. 1148 (1997) (explaining that Oklahoma altered
regulations governing pre-parole release so that inmates released on pre-parole had no expectation that they would not be reincarcerated if the Governor determined not to grant parole).
182. For instance, consider that the North Harris Montgomery Community College District
now includes in its contract for chancellor the following disclaimer: "A contract of employment
with this District creates a property interest in the position only for the period of time stated in
the contract. Such a contract creates no property interest of any kind beyond the period of time
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instance, likely rely upon faculty handbooks much less for fear of creating a property interest.1 8 3 Counsel for such administrative bodies
caution against use of mandatory language in a wide variety of
84
settings.'
The number of administrative changes is difficult to estimate.
But one can comfortably conclude that judicial intervention to compel
compliance with prior rules and regulations has some effect in prodding agencies to rescind or amend the rules.
The more important question is whether the changes to agency
practices have been beneficial. Some changes, such as Georgia's insertion of cautionary language in its parole statute, probably has had
little impact on agency behavior one way or another. But D.C.'s repeal of the guidelines detailing how officials are to make the parole
determination likely has a more substantive impact. In the future,
there will be less structure guiding the parole determination, and less
of a way for D.C. officials to ensure that parole determinations are
even-handed. Similarly, school officials can no longer spell out as
many duties and benefits in faculty handbooks. Agencies in general
may be less willing to publicize internal policies, lest the dissemination
of such policies subject the agency to subsequent review. 85 Whether
such changes benefit the public is questionable, and the changes are
directly attributable to the courts' due process jurisprudence.
Admittedly, there is likely greater impact on agencies from judicial review in the due process context than in either the APA or
FTCA setting. A finding of a liberty or property interest triggers
hearing requirements. In contrast, agencies cannot gauge as accustated in the contract. Perry v. Sindermann, 92 S. Ct. 2694 (1972) ....
" North Harris Montgomery Community College District, NHMCCD Policy Manual (visited Feb. 12, 1997) <http://
www.nhmccd.cc.tx.us:80/policy/B/bfb.html>.
183. See, e.g., Thomas v. Ward, 529 F.2d 916, 919 (4th Cir. 1975) (stating that faculty handbook "fostered an understanding that ... teachers would be employed on a continuing contract
basis"); Zimmerer v. Spencer, 485 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that faculty handbook
created expectation of continued employment); Jacobs v. Stratton. 615 P.2d 982, 984-85 (N.M.
1980) (remanding for trial to determine whether handbook created entitlement).
184. A similar change can arise whenever agencies attempt to circumvent judicial review.
For instance, in Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 945, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the
court held that the Food and Drug Administration could not issue action levels for aflatoxin (a
carcinogenic contaminant) in corn, without first engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking.
The court reasoned that, because the agency had described its own action levels as binding, the
levels were legislative rules subject to notice and comment. See id. at 947-48. In response, the
agency disclaimed any intention to be bound by the action levels. See Joel E. Hoffman, Public
Participationand Binding Effect in the Promulgation of Nonlegislative Rules: Current Developments at FDA, 22 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 1, 10 (1997). Five years later the agency extended
that policy, eschewing reliance on all of the guidance documents that it provides to the public.
See id.
185. For a recent example in a related context, see Hoffman, supra note 184.
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rately whether other rules or policies will become the lever justifying
review in the APA or FTCA context. For instance, the National Park
Service in Faber may not have considered that its study of risks at a
particular national park would ultimately subject it to liability years
later. Similarly, when OSHA officials instructed inspectors on the
proper procedures to follow in conducting inspections, they may not
have contemplated that such instructions would later expose them to
suit as in Irving. And the Maritime Administration in Clifford did not
expect its listing of factors concerning waivers to subject all grants and
denials of waivers to suit. But the decisions in Faber, Irving, and Clifford send an unmistakable signal. Agency counsel will likely advise
drafting as few mandatory policies as possible, and may suggest limit186
ing the formal directives that agency heads provide to subordinates.
On the other hand, agencies may have sufficient incentives to issue rules and regulations irrespective of the risk that the new rules will
expose the agency to suit. 1 87 OMB, for instance, may decide that the
benefits of circumscribing agencies' contracting-out decisions outweigh the prospect that some contracting-out decisions may become
mired in litigation and perhaps overturned because of promulgation of
the Circular. OSHA surely desires its inspectors to do a thorough job
despite the threat of suit.
But the parole example suggests that, at least at the margin, agencies will draft less clear rules to govern subordinate agency officials'
discretion. That change is problematic. Commentators have long encouraged agencies to issue more rules, and have decried the ossification that is seemingly a byproduct of activist judicial review. 188 They
have argued that encouraging rulemaking generally benefits the public. 18 9 Rules minimize the discretion exercised by subordinate agency
officials, afford greater notice to the public of the agency's regulatory
strategy, and to some extent ensure equal treatment among similarly
186. For instance, counsel will likely urge that any future study of risks in the national park
system be couched in the vaguest of terms, and that any rules to govern inspections include a
clause entrusting the thoroughness of any inspection to the discretion of the inspector.
187. See generally Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE
L.J. 65, 76-103 (1983).
188. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 158; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify
Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995); see also Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts
and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525
(1997); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification:Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify
Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 (1997).
189. See generally CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING (1994); CARNEGIE COMMISSION,
RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISION MAKING 56-57, 109 (1993);
David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administra-

tive Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965).
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situated individuals. Such benefits can be lost if agencies avoid rules
because of the prospect of judicial review. The parole example may
not be the exception. Thus, predicating review on a claim of inconsistency with prior rules and regulations may prompt agency practices
that do not serve public needs.
B.

The Need to Change PriorRules

Agencies frequently change policy when considering how to resolve disputes with private parties, whether in the rulemaking or adjudication context. As a theoretical matter, reviewing agency action for
compliance with preexisting policy could dampen agency efforts to
change policy. 190
Rulemaking provides the clearest context. Although rules
promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking under the
APA generally have prospective application only,191 those rules frequently reflect changes or even reversals of prior policy. For instance,
in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,192 the Court stated that "we fully recognize that
'[r]egulatory agencies do not establish rules of conduct to last forever,'
and that an agency must be given ample latitude to 'adapt their rules
and policies to the demands of changing circumstances. ' 1 1 93 The prior
rule may have been based on outdated data, or political priorities may
have altered. Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Motor Vehicle held
that the same standard of review applies to changes in agency
rulemaking as applies to formulation of the initial rule. 194 As the
Supreme Court has since explained, agencies should respond to
changing political winds:
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of
190. I do not claim that judicial review of agency action for compliance with preexisting
policy has prevented agencies from changing policy, but only that it could. Indeed, the willingness of courts to allow agencies to change policy in most contexts suggests that caselaw reflects a
process approach-in fact if not in name: Courts will second-guess agency failure to comply with
prior policy only when the agency's action does not itself constitute new policy. See infra text
accompanying notes 323-38.
191. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208-09 (1988) (holding that agencies can enact rules with retroactive reach only when Congress explicitly vests agencies with such
authority).
192. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
193. Id. at 42 (alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick,
813 F.2d 1006, 1017 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that an agency can change a prior general statement
of agency policy by substituting a new general statement of agency policy without going through
notice and comment rulemaking).
194. See 463 U.S. at 41.

19971

INCONSISTENCY WITH PRIOR RULES AND REGULATIONS

the Government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress itself ... left to be resolved by the

with the administration of the statute in light of eveagency charged195
ryday realities.
The Court has also upheld the ability of agencies to change or
formulate policy through adjudication. In the adjudicative context,
agencies apply new policies to resolve the controversy before them
almost as a matter of course. Private parties appearing before agencies are aware that the agency may fashion a new rule to resolve the
dispute. The leading case is perhaps SEC v. Chenery Corp.196 There,
the SEC conditioned its approval of a public utility holding company's
reorganization on the officers' willingness to disgorge shares of pre197
ferred stock they had purchased during the reorganization period.
The SEC had not found any wrongdoing, and had never before forced
directors to sell stock legitimately purchased. 198 The Court explained
that
problems may arise in a case which the administrative agency could
not reasonably foresee, problems which must be solved despite the
absence of a relevant general rule. Or the agency may not have had
sufficient experience with a particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule....
...

Every case of first impression has a retroactive effect .....

But such retroactivity must be balanced against the mischief of prois contrary to a statutory design or to legal and
ducing a result which199
equitable principles.
Agencies often modify policy in the context of particular factual
disputes.
Each time that courts review agency action for compliance with
preexisting rules and regulations, however, courts could deny agencies
the ability to change the law. For instance, in Faber,the National Park
Service may have determined, based on new information, that its limited resources were best spent warning of hazards at other parts of the
national park as opposed to a spot atop that one cliff. The Maritime
195. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984). The Supreme Court more recently has deferred to an agency switch in position, reasoning that "change is not invalidating" as long as the change is explained and no reliance interests
are needlessly sundered. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 116 S. Ct. 1730, 1734 (1996).
196. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
197. See id. at 199-209.
198. See id. at 198.
199. Id. at 202-03. The Court's reasoning prompted an impassioned dissent from Justice
Jackson who decried the "administrative authoritarianism, this power to decide without
law ....
It calls to mind Mr. Justice Cardozo's statement that 'Law as a guide to conduct is
reduced to the level of mere futility if it is unknown and unknowable."' Id. at 216-17 (Jackson,
J., dissenting) (quoting THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 3 (1924)).
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Administration in Clifford may have concluded that waivers for foreign flag vessels would now be appropriate given changing economic
conditions. And, in Board of Pardons v. Allen, Montana might have
decided to alter the way it implemented the parole release statute in

order to protect the public from inmates with greater recidivist tendencies. In a wide variety of settings, agencies may wish to implement

new policies to address contemporary realities, despite the possible
existence of previous agency policies charting a different course. 20 0 In
the APA, FTCA, and due process contexts, courts may discourage

agencies from applying policies responsive to contemporary concerns
if they stringently review agency actions that depart from preexisting
20 1
rules and regulations.
Agencies, therefore, arguably should be able to formulate new

policies and apply them to the case at hand, in both the rulemaking
and adjudication contexts, at least as long as they do not thereby punish prior behavior. 20 2 Any judicial doctrine that forces agencies to fol200. Any agency decision to depart from preexisting rules might undermine a reliance interest. The justification for applying the Due Process Clause to protect regulatory entitlements
stems from the need to protect individuals and firms who have relied on the existence of governmental benefits, whether a job, welfare, or a government grant. When private parties have reason to rely on continued availability of such benefits, then agencies arguably should not be able
to change course to deprive them of such benefits, absent notice.
But even if no entitlements are created, private parties often rely on the existing regulatory
framework. Private parties take into account the current regulatory system when structuring
their business affairs, irrespective of the lack of a property interest. Change in the status quo
may affect those interests directly. Nonetheless, courts have upheld agencies' authority to formulate new policies without affording notice. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267
(1974) (holding that the Board may choose whether to fashion policy through rulemaking or
adjudication); Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. FERC, 826 F.2d 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(en banc) (holding that the FERC may apply a new statutory interpretation to resolve a dispute
with private parties); Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (detailing the factors for determining whether an exception should be made allowing the
retroactive application of new policy).
201. Indeed, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to force agencies to remain tied to earlier
erroneous pronouncements of policy, even when detrimental reliance has occurred. In OPM v.
Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 417 (1990), for instance, a former employee of the Navy Department
sought advice from Navy personnel about how much he could earn without jeopardizing his
government annuity. A Navy official informed Richmond of his rights based on regulations that
had been superseded, and following that advice, Richmond accepted the new employment. See
id. at 417-18. Later, however, the Office of Personnel Management cut his annuity because of
his earnings. See id. at 418. The Supreme Court rejected Richmond's estoppel claim, reaffirming
its longstanding view that the government should never be held to the pledges of its employees if
those pledges are in fact contrary to government policy. See id. at 419-20. The government, in
other words, can rely on current policy to deny a claim even when a private party is misinformed
or misled as to the nature of that policy.
202. When a significant statutory penalty is at stake, courts have refused to permit agencies
to apply unforeseen policy to the parties before it. In GeneralElectric Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324,
1325 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the court refused to enforce a fine. The court reasoned that "[t]he due
process clause . . . 'prevents ...

deference from validating the application of a regulation that

fails to give fair warning of the conduct it prohibits or requires."' Id. at 1328 (second omission in
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low preexisting doctrines has the potential cost of stymieing agency
ability to address problems based on contemporary technological,
political, and economic realities.
C.

Impact of Third Party Review

In addition to the activity-level effect problems and the possibility
of discouraging agencies from changing rules, judicial review more directly impinges upon agency policymaking by permitting judges to interpret the nature and scope of the prior agency rule allegedly
violated. Courts may intrude into agency policymaking when they disagree with agencies as to whether the prior rules are binding; whether
the prior rules were intended to benefit private parties; what requirements the rules delineate; and the consequences attendant upon a fail20 3
ure to follow the prior rules.
1.

Binding v. Precatory rules

Courts have not always sufficiently recognized the heterogeneous
nature of agency rules. Agencies do not intend many policy statements and directives to be binding in the same sense as most, if not all,
legislative rules. To predicate judicial review on non-binding policy
guidance or directives would chill agencies from offering guidance to
lower level officials and private parties alike.
Agencies should be able to provide guidance unfettered by the
possibility of later suit because of an official's subsequent failure to
follow such guidelines. For instance, agencies may set guidelines, as in
Cardoza, to guide the discretion of lower level employees without intending to commit the agency to any particular course of action. Simioriginal) (quoting Gates & Fox Co. v. OSHRC, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). The court
further explained that the agency regulations did not clearly enough afford the company notice
as to its responsibilities. See id. at 1330; see also Kropp Forge Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 657 F.2d
119, 122-24 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that statutes and regulations penalizing conduct must provide an adequate warning). Changed policy may conflict with reliance interests, and courts have
accordingly struggled in reaching an accommodation between agency flexibility and individual
interests. Courts have only second-guessed the agency's determination to change policy when
the agency has applied quasi-criminal sanctions to previously lawful conduct. Despite the reliance interests, therefore, Chenery remains the norm, and agencies routinely apply new policies
to resolve contemporary disputes.
203. But see Peter Raven-Hansen, Making Agencies Follow Orders: Judicial Review of
Agency Violations of Executive Order 12,291, 1983 DuKE L.J. 285, 333 ("[I]t is for the courts, not
the executive, to decide when and whether self-imposed executive limitations should be judicially enforced."); Rodney A. Smolla, The Erosion of the Principle that the Government Must
Follow Self-Imposed Rules, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 472, 473 (1984) ("[M]ainstream principles of
constitutional and administrative law require courts to reinvigorate the precept that an agency
must follow its own rules.").
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larly, OSHA may encourage inspectors to abide by certain standards
in conducting investigations on the shop floor, as in Irving, to treat
businesses comparably. And parole release guidelines ensure to some
extent that similarly situated prisoners are treated alike, without
straightjacketing officials as they review specific cases. Senior agency
officials may intend that subordinate officials conform their conduct
to the guidelines or standards, but allow for deviation given the wide
array of circumstances that may confront the decisionmaker.
Moreover, even if courts were only to review agency departures
from binding policy, courts and agencies may disagree as to whether
the preexisting agency rule is binding. The agency in Faber no doubt
argued that its study of the risks in the park was not intended to bind
agency officials to any particular course of conduct. The regulation in
20 4
Cardoza reads more as a guide than as a mandatory directive.
Courts, in other words, have considerable latitude in ascertaining
which agency rules are binding. 20 5
2. Intended audience for rule
Some agency regulations clearly benefit private parties, and agencies intend private parties to rely on such rules. Absent notice of
change, private parties should be entitled to rely on agency compliance with such regulations, whether the regulations are legislative or
not. In United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,20 6 the Justice Department had promulgated regulations mandating that an alien was
entitled to a hearing before the Board of Immigration Appeals to argue in favor of suspending a deportation order.207 The Court held
that, as long as the regulations remained in effect, "the Attorney General denies himself the right to sidestep the Board or dictate its decision ..... ",208 Agencies lack the discretion to disregard rules that were
formulated to benefit private parties.
But many rules cannot be so characterized. Agencies fashion
rules to guide the performance of lower level officials. The logic of
permitting private parties to challenge such officials' compliance with
the rules, even when the rules are legislative, is not self-evident. In204. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
205. See Raven-Hansen, supra note 203, at 301-11 (tracing the common law distinction between mandatory and precatory statutory commands); cf. Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and its
Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1299 (1997) (explaining that the idea of discretion can be
more helpfully understood in terms of supervision and policy).
206. 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
207. See id. at 265-66.
208. Id. at 267.
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deed, in a variety of contexts, courts have recognized the costs of private enforcement of rules designed to improve internal agency
performance.
For instance, in Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 20 9 a
meat-packing association sought to enjoin enforcement of Depart2 10
ment of Agriculture regulations revising grading standards for beef.
The association alleged that the new standards violated the terms of
Executive Order No. 11,821 "which require[d] an evaluation of the
inflationary impact of all major legislative proposals, rules, and regulations" issued by executive agencies. 211 OMB Circular No. A-107, in
turn, implemented the Order and directed agencies to consider the
effect of new rules "on employment and energy supplies or demand. '' 21 2 At the district court level, the association had evidently
persuasively argued that the agency had deviated from the guidelines
2 13
set forth in the Circular.

The court of appeals, however, held that the Order (and implementing Circular) was "intended primarily as a managerial tool for
implementing the President's personal economic policies and not as a
legal framework enforceable by private civil action. '2 14 To permit review at the behest of private parties could well result in transforming

the economic policies envisioned by the President.215 Judges, instead
of the President, would enjoy final say on a wide variety of factors,

such as forecasting energy supplies or calibrating future inflation
rates.

21 6

209. 526 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1975).
210. See id. at 231.
211. Id.; see also Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (1974).
212. Meat Packers, 526 F.2d at 234.
213. See Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 395 F. Supp. 923, 932 (D. Neb.), rev'd, 526
F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1975).
214. Meat Packers, 526 F.2d at 236.
215. See id.
216. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's decision in Dong v. Slattery, 84 F.3d 82
(2d Cir. 1996), is similar. There, a Chinese national argued that, were he deported, he would
face substantial punishment in China for attempting to thwart its population control policies.
See id. at 84. For support, he cited Executive Order 12,711, see id. at 85, which directs the
Attorney General "to provide for enhanced consideration under the immigration laws for individuals from any country who express a fear of persecution upon return to their country related
to that country's policy of forced abortion or coerced sterilization .... " 55 Fed. Reg. 13,897
(1990). He argued that the Attorney General's deportation order was arbitrary and capricious
under the APA due to its conflict with the Executive Order. See Dong, 84 F.3d at 85. Because
the Executive Order did not have the force and effect of law, however, the court held that APA
review was unavailable. See id. at 86; see also Chen v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331, 1339 (4th Cir. 1995)
(similarly rejecting a claim under Executive Order 12,711 because a "court should not enforce an
executive order intended for the internal management of the President's cabinet").
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Consider, as well, the Supreme Court's decision in United States
v. Caceres.2 17 There, a defendant charged with bribing an IRS official
sought to exclude tape recordings of his conversations with the
agent. 2 18 The agent wore a concealed radio transmitter in contravention of IRS regulations limiting recordings to consensual contexts absent specific authorization from senior officials. 2 19 The IRS restriction
was of benefit to targets of IRS investigations, 220 but principally
sought to cabin the authority of lower level officials. 221 Senior IRS
222
officials, after all, could order the recordings on their own initiative.
In refusing to exclude the evidence from the trial, the Court reasoned
that
[i]n the long run, it is far better to have rules like those contained in
the IRS Manual, and to tolerate occasional erroneous administration of the kind displayed by this record, than either to have no
by statute, or to have them framed in a
rules except those mandated
2 23
mere precatory form.

Violations of the agency rule were to be punished as an internal
224
agency matter.
Legislative rules as well as circulars and internal manual provisions may be structured to cabin the discretion of lower level agency
officials. The fact that notice and comment rulemaking preceded
adoption of a rule makes it far more likely that the rule was intended
to benefit private parties, but may not be dispositive.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that private parties are not
necessarily entitled to the benefit of all statutory language limiting
agency discretion. In United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property,225 the Supreme Court reviewed the Ninth Circuit's determination
to throw out a forfeiture action on the ground that the customs officials had failed to adhere to statutory terms.226 The statute at issue
directs customs officers to "report promptly" every seizure to the
217. 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
218. See id. at 743.
219. See id. at 743, 744 n.4 (quoting IRS Manual, para. 652.22. (in effect Sept. 1975)).
220. See id. at 755.
221. See id. at 743 n.3 (describing the IRS process for requesting permission to conduct
monitoring).
222. See id.
223. See id. at 756.
224. See id; see also American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 538
(1970) (tolerating violation of internal procedural rule because "[t]he rules were not intended
primarily to confer important procedural benefits upon individuals in the face of otherwise unfettered discretion .... ").
225. 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
226. See id. at 45.
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United States Attorney who then must "forthwith" initiate any forfeiture action that the information warranted.2 27 The timing directive at
least indirectly benefits private parties, encouraging prompt legal action stemming from a seizure. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court disagreed that the government's failure to abide by such statutory terms
warranted dismissing the forfeiture action. 228 The Court explained,
"We have long recognized that 'many statutory requisitions intended

for the guide of officers in the conduct of business devolved upon
them... do not limit their power or render its exercise in disregard of
the requisitions ineffectual.' ' 229 In other words, some statutes, like
agency rules, address agency behavior without committing agencies to
2 30
outside scrutiny.
Thus, the lesson of Meat Packers and Caceresis that agencies pro-

mulgate rules for reasons other than affording rights to private parties.231 Agencies may set time limits as in James Daniel Good Real
Property (or in a hearing context as in Olim) to guide the discretion of
subordinate officers. The same is true under a variety of Executive
Orders, whether under Order 12,866,232 which imposes cost-benefit
rules upon agencies, or under OMB Circular A-76, to govern the con-

siderations in reaching the contracting-out decision. 233

227. Id. at 63 (quoting 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-04 (1988)).
228. See id. at 65.
229. Id. at 63 (quoting French v. Edwards, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 506, 511 (1872)). Much as the
Court noted in Olim when addressing the due process context, not every mandatory rule is
crafted solely for the benefit of third parties. See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
230. See also Lewis v. United States, 70 F.3d 597, 602 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that the
Customs Service's statutory obligation to refer cases to the Department of Justice reflects internal requirements only).
231. In the entitlements context, most regulation is intended to benefit private parties directly, but the APA and FTCA cases are quite different.
232. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,744 (1993) (requiring cost-benefit analysis of proposed major regulations), states in Section 10 that "[t]his Executive order is intended
only to improve the internal management of the Federal Government and does not create any
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity."
233. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, CIRCULAR No. A-76 (1983). In Diebold v.
United States, 947 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1991), the court exercised review over a challenge to an
agency's implementation of the Circular. See supra text accompanying notes 59-68. Indeed, the
result in Diebold is striking given that the Circular itself stated that it "shall not be construed to
create any substantive or procedural basis for anyone to challenge any agency action or inaction
on the basis that such action or inaction was not in accordance with" it. CIRCULAR A-76, at 4.
The Supplement echoed that view, stating that the internal appeals procedure specified "does
not authorize an appeal outside the agency or a judicial review." OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-76 SuPP., at 1-14 (1983). The court of appeals in part was influenced by
Congress's apparent endorsement of the cost comparison rules in the Circular, and its implicit
incorporation of that methodology in legislation. See Diebold, 947 F.2d at 790.
Nonetheless, in HHS v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 844 F.2d 1087, 1094-96 (4th Cir.
1988) (en banc), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in contrast held that the Circular
was not intended to be binding. HHS challenged the FLRA's order requiring it to bargain with
the union over its duty to comply with OMB Circular A-76. Under the Civil Service Reform Act
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Court v. Agency understanding of the rule

In addition, the agency and court may well disagree as to the

proper application of the preexisting policy. It is one thing for the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission to determine whether review proceedings would "interfere with the efficient disposition of
other Commission business, ' 234 and quite another for a court to second-guess that determination. The court lacks experience in gauging
the agency's assessment of its own objectives and priorities. 2 35 Similarly, in Diebold,236 the court of appeals directed the lower court to
determine whether the agency followed the cost comparisons in OMB
Circular A-76 correctly, 237 determinations that courts previously had
ruled off limits to the judiciary. 238 The Diebold court did not acknowl-

edge the important differences between review by a court for compliance with agency-created law, and review by the agency itself.

("CRSA"), a union proposal-even if rejected by the agency-can become incorporated into
any eventual agreement through a binding resolution mechanism. See 5 U.S.C. § 7119(b),
(c)(5)(B)-(C) (1994). The FLRA reasoned that because agencies were required under the
CRSA to make determinations with respect to contracting out "in accordance with applicable
laws," CRSA, 5 U.S.C. § 7106(2) (1994), the union's proposal in no way interfered with management prerogatives. See HHS, 844 F.2d at 1090. The FLRA held that the agency was required to
abide by the Circular in reaching the contracting-out decision. See id.
The en banc court of appeals disagreed. See id. at 1088. It held that subjecting an agency's
compliance with the Circular to outside review would intrude sharply into the agency's managerial prerogatives. See id. at 1094-95. It explained that if review were permitted
it would be impossible for the executive branch to formulate policy directives, and for
the President to instruct his subordinates, without giving rise to third party rights to
challenge those policies and instructions. Whether an agency head is following the directives of the President is not for an arbitrator to determine ....[The] only alternative
would be to cease issuing such directives, which would . .. result in confusion and
inefficiency.
Id. at 1095. As in Meat Packers, the Court concluded that the Circular was binding only to the
extent enforced by the President and OMB. See id. (stating that the Circular "create[s] no rights
enforceable by third parties").
234. Rules Relating to Review of Exchange Disciplinary or Other Adverse Action, § 9.30(b),
43 Fed. Reg. 59,350, 59,352 (1978) (formerly codified at 17 C.F.R. § 9.30(b)); see also Cardoza v.
CFFC, 768 F.2d 1542, 1550 (1985).
235. Similarly, while the agency in Faber v. United States, 56 F.3d 1122, 1123 (9th Cir. 1995),
determined to warn of particular risks posed by hazards at the national park, a court upon review may take a different view as to the priority or extent of such warnings.
236. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
237. See 947 F.2d at 789.
238. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2017 v. Brown, 680 F.2d 722, 723
(11th Cir. 1982) (declining to review Army decision to contract out); Local 2855, American
Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States, 602 F.2d 574, 576 (3d Cir. 1979) (declining to review
same); see also Matter of Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Services, B-243318, 1991 U.S. Comp.
Gen. LEXIS 522 (Comp. Gen. April 12, 1991) (agency declining to review the same).
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4.

Consequences of departing from prior policy

Finally, permitting judicial review to assess compliance with preexisting rules and regulations results in consequences likely unintended by the agency. 239 Even when an agency official's acts
unquestionably depart from a prior rule or policy, there may exist
wide disagreement as to what the ramifications of that departure
should be. The agency's view of what consequence should attend
agency officials' deviation from previously set policy may be quite different from those envisioned by a court upon review in either the
APA or FTCA context. Agency officials who implement policy ineffectively may be subject to discipline, but not suit by private parties.
In the APA context, for instance, agency action should not necessarily be set aside merely because agency officials acted inconsistently
with prior policy. The departure may well signal that some discipline
is warranted. The issue of compliance does not directly illuminate,
however, whether the agency's action was arbitrary and capricious,
unless a failure to follow prior policy is automatically considered arbitrary and capricious. After finding that the agency did not comply
with a prior rule, a reviewing court must still subsequently determine
whether the agency's otherwise unreviewable action was unlawful.
For instance, in Cardoza, CFTC officials may have decided not to
review the disciplinary action for reasons other than those enumerated in the agency guidelines, but if Congress implicitly vested the entire decision in agency hands because of the agency's institutional
advantages, then judicial review remains problematic, at least absent
constitutional challenge to the agency's failure to act. 240 In Chaney,
even if the agency had promulgated an internal policy to investigate
each instance reported in which an approved drug was used for unapproved purposes, the agency's subsequent determination not to investigate the charges in that case may still have stemmed from resource
allocation determinations and thus be inappropriate for judicial sec24 1
ond-guessing.
In the FTCA context, the consequences of permitting the tort suit
to proceed are even more striking than in the APA context-a possi239. See Irving v. United States, 49 F.3d 830, 834 (lst Cir. 1995).
240. See id. at 834-35.

241. In contrast, courts determining whether to imply causes of action directly from statutory
or agency directives use the touchstone of legislative or agency intent. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 680 (1985)
(explaining that a regulation that obligates an agency to act may not provide law to apply unless
it was intended to create enforceable rights).
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ble tort judgment. Even though an official may deviate from policy,
that official's acts may nonetheless be grounded in social and political
policy and therefore arguably should remain immune from judicial
second-guessing. In Irving, the First Circuit acknowledged that the
agency's decision of how to inspect workplaces was susceptible to policy analysis.242 Nonetheless, the court ruled that it could review the
agency's action if plaintiff demonstrated that the official's actions contravened prior practice. 243 Courts, in other words, reserved for themselves the power to determine whether the agency's action was
negligent even though it was grounded in economic and political policy. The agency official's departure from prior policy is not tantamount to negligence and thus does not obviate the court's necessity to
second-guess the agency's judgment as to inspection priorities. The
upshot is that a court gauges the reasonableness of agency action that
it is ill-equipped to assess.
In sum, reviewing agency action that is otherwise unreviewable
for compliance with previously set rules and regulations may have
considerable costs. Agencies may heed the signal and create fewer, or
at least more discretionary rules, as the parole example attests. In
addition, agencies theoretically may be denied the ability to apply new
policies more responsive to contemporary realities to resolve a particular dispute. Moreover, courts may arrogate to themselves policymaking authority by interpreting the prior rules differently than
would the agencies themselves. In addition, courts may sanction
agencies for departing from prior policy far more harshly than the
agencies would themselves.
Despite those costs, courts currently permit review of most claims
of agency departures from prior policy, irrespective of the nature of
the rule allegedly violated. 244 Perhaps the benefits from review outweigh the potential costs enumerated. Concerns for limiting agency
discretion and for safeguarding individual reliance interests may militate for continued review. Judicial oversight can, in addition, help ensure that similarly situated firms are treated comparably. Moreover,
the appearance of propriety cannot likely be maintained if judges fail
to respond when agencies fail to comply with their own rules. Judicial
242. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
244. As noted previously, see supra text accompanying notes 110-13, some courts have demanded that the rule violated at least be binding in the sense that agency officials are to exercise
no discretion in applying the rule's terms. Others, however, have not. See supra notes 44-58
(discussing Cardoza and Clifford).
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review however, might not be needed in every case to attain such
laudable goals. More limited review might help courts oversee agencies without intruding as far into their policymaking realm. Courts
could exercise review over agency action that would otherwise be unreviewable only when reliance is most important or when there is
greater need for monitoring subordinate agency officials for compliance with prior rules and regulations.

III.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

In light of the costs engendered by reviewing otherwise unreviewable agency action for compliance with preexisting rules and regulations, courts might adjust doctrine in a number of ways. Review might
be tailored to minimize the costs of review sketched above, while still
preserving judicial oversight where most needed.
A.

Deference to Agency

First, courts could decline to entertain such claims at all. If the
agency action is grounded in resource allocation or other discretionary
policy, then the courts could decline to review challenges to that policy unless Congress so directs. The fact that agencies might at times
act arbitrarily in allocating resources, or even act against their own
prior pledge of conduct, would be immaterial. In short, while the
hands-off approach might be unacceptable in some due process contexts, there is no reason why private parties must be able to sue agencies when agency acts are based on discretionary financial or political
decisions. The scope of the areas that should be reserved to agency
discretion may be debatable, but agency officials do not forfeit their
claim to discretion merely by acting inconsistently with prior rules and
regulations.
The discretionary function exception and the nonreviewability
section in the APA might act something like the political question
doctrine, marking an area off limits to the judiciary. For instance, in
Nixon v. United States245 a majority of the Supreme Court concluded
that it would not reach the merits of Judge Nixon's claim that the Senate had failed to try him within the meaning of the Constitution's impeachment clause, which provides that the "Senate shall have the sole
Power to try all Impeachments. ' '246 Nixon asserted that the founding
generation intended try to refer to judicial proceedings and that the
245. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
246. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; see Nixon, 506 U.S. at 226.
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committee deliberations leading to his impeachment violated this constitutional protection. 247 The Court, however, concluded that the try

language "lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of review of the Senate's actions .... "248 Even though

the Senate in the past had afforded trial-type proceedings, 249 the
Court did not intervene. The call was reserved to the Senate despite

the possible inconsistency over time. Just as an assertion that a government action contravened previously set policy would not open the
door to judicial review if the political question doctrine applied, so

such an assertion should not arguably open to review claims that are
otherwise unreviewable under the FTCA's discretionary function exception or the APA.

The political question analogy, however, is problematic in the entitlement cases in particular. The Constitution limits agency decisions
to alter distribution of benefits principally because of reliance concerns. 2 50 Individuals are entitled to rely upon some agency commit-

ments, whether in the welfare or job context. In choosing jobs, for
instance, job security plays a key role. Applicants may well trade
greater security for less pay, as in the case of civil service2 51 and some
union jobs. 252 In the benefits context as well, individuals rely on
agency commitments to particular levels of benefits. 25 3 To permit
agency officials to ignore stated guidelines for providing those benefits
would substantially disrupt individuals' lives. The very rationale of

the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence turns on safeguarding
private parties' legitimate expectations of entitlement. 254 Whenever
individuals fundamentally rely on agency commitment of resources,
255
review may be critical to protect that reliance interest.

247. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229.
248. Id. at 230.
249. See Rose Auslander, Impeaching the Senate's Use of Trial Committees, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 68, 74 (1992); Alexa J. Smith, FederalJudicial Impeachment: Defining Process Due, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 649 n.64 (1995).
250. See supra notes 115-29 and accompanying text.
251. See James M. Dodge, Taxing Human Capital Acquisition Costs-Or Why Costs of
Higher Education Should Not Be Deducted or Amortized, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 927, 936 (1993).
252. See ROBERT J. FLANAGAN ET AL., ECONOMICS OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
335 (1989) (noting that if unions push for too high a wage rate, then they risk losing too many
union jobs).
253. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972).
254. See, e.g., id. at 577.
255. The reliance interest can be overstated. Private parties at times should anticipate and
protect themselves from changes in government regulation, just as they protect themselves by
anticipating changes in the market supply and demand. Investors should discount the value of
their activities by the possibility of alteration in the legal regime. See generally Louis Kaplow,
An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions,99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 522-39 (1986). Moreover,
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The reliance interest, however, cannot explain review in the
FTCA and APA contexts. No reliance interest was created by the
internal management study in Faber addressing park safety. The
union in Clifford did not rely on agency waiver practice under the
Merchant Marine Act to structure its affairs. 256 Employees have not
relied upon OSHA practices to safeguard their safety in most workplaces. Employees may prefer that OSHA investigates their place of
employment, but they presumably do not rely on particular OSHA
inspection policies before deciding where to work or what level of
safety precautions to take on their own.257 Similarly, the OMB Circular addressed in Diebold has not created any expectation among federal employees that their work would not be contracted out to the
private sector. Unlike in the benefits or work tenure context, therefore, judicial review in the FTCA and APA contexts cannot be based
on protecting a reliance interest. The political question analogy may
still hold sway.
Nonetheless, there still may be need to protect private parties
from inconsistent agency action, even when no reliance interest is at
stake. The potential for arbitrary action is greater whenever agencies
fail to comply with preexisting rules. The departure from prior rules
may signal bias or inadvertence. In Berkovitz, for instance, the agency
may have tried to cut corners in approving doses of vaccine prior to
obtaining the necessary information from vaccine manufacturers. In
Diebold the court may have sensed that the agency's decision to contract out goods and services at Fort Knox stemmed from anti-union
animus. And in Faber, agency officials may have failed to erect the
warning signs atop the falls as recommended years before merely because of bureaucratic sloth.
In addition to the potential for bias or arbitrariness, requiring
consistency helps legitimate administrative agencies. Particularly
when the policy is embodied in a legislative rule, departures undermine the public's faith in the administrative process. Consistency is a
value prized by the public, both for private ordering as well as for
assuring deliberate governance. Thus, the political question option
private parties have no justifiable warrant to rely on particular forms of governmental regulation
if their activities are wrongful. Cf. Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal
and Civil Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2160-65 (1996) (arguing that individuals
should not be protected from retroactive lawmaking if their conduct is inherently wrongful).
256. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
257. But see Barash, supra note 102, at 1331 (arguing that "[t]he reliance concern . . . is
equally applicable in the context of regulations giving rise to potential liability under the Federal
Tort Claims Act" as it is in due process cases).
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not only fails to address a reliance interest that may be created by
agency rules and regulations, but it fails as well to further rule-of-law
values 258 which require agencies to follow their own previously set
rules when important policy is at stake.
B.

Justifiable Reliance By Private Parties

A slightly less deferential alternative would be to allow judicial
review only when the private parties can justifiably rely on a prior
agency rule or regulation intended to confer rights upon outsiders. As
in the Meat Packers case, courts would focus on the issue of justifiable
reliance, irrespective of whether the challenged agency action could
be considered discretionary. When the agency manifests a sufficient
intention to confer rights upon private parties, judicial review will act
to further, rather than frustrate, agency regulatory efforts.
There is undoubtedly a spectrum along which agency ruleswhether legislative or less formal policy statements-can be placed.
At one end lie rules primarily crafted to control agency subordinates.
At the other end lie policies specifically directed at involving private
parties and guaranteeing some right to notice, participation, or even
suit. Because all agency rules have at least an indirect effect upon
private parties, crafting a test to distinguish rules principally intended
as internal management directives from those benefiting private parties is problematic. Despite this difficulty, a key determinant, as in the
due process cases, is reliance-was the private party entitled to rely on
the agency policy? 259 When reliance exists, permitting agency officials
to depart from prior policy should not be countenanced. The justifiable reliance theory would be relevant in all the contexts addressed.
At times, the language of the regulation may itself clarify whether
private parties can justifiably rely on the prior policy. In Greater Los
Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Baldrige260 the plaintiffs challenged the Department of Commerce's failure to follow its own regulations requiring agency investigation of certain complaints about
discrimination on the basis of disability. 26 1 The plaintiffs had alleged
that a public television station discriminated against the hearing im258. On the differing conceptions of the rule of law, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of
Law" As a Concept in ConstitutionalDiscourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997).
259. Asking whether the policy intended to benefit the third party is a more open-ended
inquiry because of the focus on agency intent as opposed to justifiable reliance by third parties.
Such an inquiry would lead to review more frequently.
260. 827 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1987).
261. See id. at 1356.
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paired by failing to caption its programs. 262 The pertinent agency regulation mandated that the agency investigate all complaints and then
"so inform" the complainant if no remedial steps were advised. 26 3
The agency at a minimum had committed itself to communicating its
decision to those lodging the complaint. 264 Complainants were entitled to rely on that pledge. A challenge based on the agency's refusal
to communicate therefore was properly held to be reviewable. 265 In
contrast, the language of Circular A-76 evinces OMB's intent not to
invite third party reliance on the Circular's terms: "[The Circular]
should not be construed to create any substantive or procedural basis
for anyone to challenge any agency action or inaction on the basis that

such an action or inaction was not in accordance with

'

it." 266

Accord-

ingly, the reliance theory would not permit review on the grounds that
the agency decision to contract out conflicted with the terms of the
Circular.
If the language is not dispositive, then the structure of the agency
regulation could be assessed to determine the justifiability of the reliance. 2 67 For instance, government officials' assessment of park risks in
Faber obviously was in no way intended to invite reliance by private
parties. 268 Private parties generally have only a limited ability to influence or even learn of an internal study such as the one completed in
that case. On the other hand, had officials erected a sign inviting all
comers to enjoy the diving, the reliance would be apparent. Similarly,
in Cardoza, the question would be whether private parties justifiably
rely on standards promulgated by the agency to govern when agency
officials should review discipline meted out by the member exchanges.
A negative answer is relatively clear: individuals may structure their
conduct so as to escape discipline by the member exchanges, but are
highly unlikely to factor in the prospect of CIFTC review before undertaking the contested action. The Seventh Circuit's statement that "the
262. See id. at 1356-57.
263. Id. at 1360-61.
264. See id.

265. See id. at 1361.
266. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, CIRCULAR No. A-76 (1983); see also supra
note 233.
267. Cf. Raven-Hansen, supra note 10, at 21-22 (exploring, in the regulatory estoppel context, whether agency regulation is primarily intended to benefit the agency or individuals).
268. Neither could private parties justifiably rely on the requirement in Berkovitz that drug
companies submit specific information to the National Institute of Health before receiving drug
approval. See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 542 (1988). Individuals may have relied
on the fact that government regulators monitored the drug companies, but not that any particular regulatory path was followed.
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public justifiably has come to rely" upon the CFTC's internal guidelines 269 is difficult to understand.
Similarly, in the parole cases, the question the courts would ask is
whether prisoners are entitled to rely on established guidelines governing release. Under a reliance approach, the liberty interest cases
are quite close, for agencies establish parameters for administrative
segregation or work release programs to provide incentives for prisoners as well as to attain consistency within the system. For instance,
providing good-time credits to shape an inmate's behavior would satisfy the test, but providing good time credits in the case of overcrowding might not. 270 On the other hand, because agencies create most
job, welfare, and grant entitlements for the purpose of fostering reliance in private parties, such rules would open the agency to external
review.
The reliance approach would not leave all agency departures
from prior rules unchecked. The agency officials who promulgated
the preexisting rules-whether senior officials at the same agency or
at OMB-have an incentive to ensure that the rules are followed. Departures from the rules undermine the policy goals animating formulation of the rules. OMB can exert pressure on recalcitrant agencies to
adhere to its rules, 271 and high level agency officials can discipline
wayward subordinates who ignore preexisting policy. Employees'
prospect for advancement may be blocked. Some checks exist, therefore, even in the absence of judicial review.
Although the reliance approach would preserve agency discretion, it may insufficiently compel compliance with preexisting regulations for the sake of consistency. Courts may be suspicious that the
departure from preexisting rules signals arbitrary behavior or masks
some invidious motive. Senior agency officials may lack the information or will to impose effective discipline on government employeeswhether inspectors or park officials-who stray from prior policy. Or,
they may condone short cuts because of scarce resources. In Faber,
the lack of a warning may have benefited senior officials who personally believed that warning signs detracted from the beauty of the falls.
Senior OSHA officials may worry that forcing inspectors to investi269. Cardoza v. CFTC, 768 F.2d 1542, 1550 (7th Cir. 1985).
270. An ex post facto problem, however, would still exist. See Lynce v. Mathis, 117 S.Ct.
891, 898 (1997).
271. See, e.g., Susan J. Tolchin, PresidentialPower and the Politics of RARG, REGULATION,
July-Aug. 1979, at 44, 44-45 (addressing presidential enforcement of the OMB cost-benefit
order).
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gate each machine would prompt factory owners, because of the intrusion and delay, to complain stridently to influential members of
Congress.
Ultimately, therefore, the desirability of the reliance approach is
debatable. The approach avoids intruding upon agency prerogatives,
yet may insufficiently account for the harms arising from agency officials' departure from preexisting policy, even that primarily intended
to benefit the agencies themselves.
C. Agency Intent to be Bound
A less deferential approach would inquire whether the agency intended to bind lower level officials, irrespective of the reliance on such
rules by private parties. This approach would focus principally on
whether agency officials enjoyed the discretion or flexibility to ignore
the rule or regulation, whatever the language of the provision. Agencies intend virtually all legislative rules-but only a portion of the interpretive rules, policy statements, circulars, and advice that typify
agency practice-to be binding.
As with the reliance approach sketched above, courts could often
ascertain whether the agency sought to bind lower level officials by
examining the language of the prior rule. The phrasing in the OMB
Circular did not evidently permit agency employees the discretion to
ignore its terms. 272 Similarly, the court in Irving inquired whether
agency inspectors had any choice but to examine each machine. 273 In
contrast, the management study in Faber did not evidently intend to
274
bind agency officials because no mandatory steps were specified.
When the language is not clear, the structure of the rule may lend
clues. For instance, the regulation in Cardoza providing guidance as
to whether the agency should review challenges to discipline meted
out by the member exchanges 275 was not likely intended to be binding.
The regulation reads as a discretionary guide to conduct, not as a rigorous algorithm. Thus, language and context must be assessed to determine whether the agency intended to remove all discretion from
officials.
The agency intent version, however, may insufficiently respect
agency prerogatives. Judicial review for compliance with previous
272. See Diebold v. United States, 947 F.2d 787, 798 (6th Cir. 1991).
273. See Irving v. United States, 49 F.3d 830, 834 (1st Cir. 1995).
274. See Faber v. United States, 56 F.3d 1122, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting the study's
vague language).
275. See Cardoza v. CFIC, 768 F.2d 1542, 1548 (7th Cir. 1985).
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rules and regulations, as discussed previously, may subject agencies to
consequences that are incommensurate with their failure to comply.
Even if we all value agency fidelity to prior rules, we may not agree as
to the result or penalty that should follow. The Supreme Court recognized in James Daniel Good Real Property276 and Caceres277 that consequences can be critical. It may be excessive to punish agencies by
permitting review of otherwise unreviewable action merely because
some agency rule was violated.
For instance, exposing the government to tort liability because of
the government's failure to follow some internal directive, as in Faber,
may be disproportionate. The failure to place warning signs stems
from a resource allocation question, no matter that the agency at one
point indicated that it would commit resources a particular way. For
whatever reason, agency officials changed course and did not comply
with the preexisting policy. That departure might warrant sanction by
the agency, but not necessarily subject the government to a tort judgment. If the Supreme Court means to protect from tort suit all agency
actions "susceptible to policy analysis, ' 278 then the agency's action remains susceptible to policy analysis whether it represents a departure
from preexisting policy or not.
In the APA context as well, if the agency's action is otherwise
unreviewable, judicial error costs will not be kept to a minimum
merely because an agency official departs from some prior regulation.
A nonenforcement decision, for instance, may be quite difficult to second-guess, irrespective of the agency official's failure to comply with
an internal rule, as arguably occurred in Cardoza and Clifford. A departure from a prior rule may be unfortunate, but is not tantamount to
finding the ultimate action arbitrary and capricious. Departures
should be kept to a minimum, but not necessarily through the threat
of such sanctions.
D. Normative Approach
Instead of reviewing all otherwise unreviewable agency actions
that are alleged to be inconsistent with preexisting rules and regulations-as many courts do now-courts could review agency departures only from prior positions that they deem most important. The
importance could lie in the individual interest at stake, or in the im276.
277.
278.
& Van

See supra notes 225-31 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 217-24 and accompanying text.
United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325 (1991). For a scathing critique, see Peterson
Der Weide, supra note 102, at 465-73.
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portance of the policy implicated. Courts could devise doctrine to ascertain when compelling agencies to follow preexisting rules is critical.
The Supreme Court has recently manifested such an approach in
the due process context. 279 Although the Supreme Court has not altered its doctrine in the property context, 280 it no longer requires
agencies to abide by all rules implicating liberty interests. 281 It will
only enforce liberty interests it believes to be "of real substance. '282
Change in the Supreme Court's approach to liberty interests first
appeared in Olim. 283 There, the Court held that "[p]rocess is not an
end in itself. Its constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive in'284
terest to which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement.
In refusing to apply due process guarantees, the Court reasoned that
the agency's departure from prior regulations does not automatically
trigger judicial review of the merits of the agency's action.285 Rather,
the Court asserted the power to distinguish substantive from procedural interests underlying the prior regulatory pledge. 286
The Court distanced itself further from its former entitlement approach in Sandin v. Conner.287 Prison authorities charged Conner
with several prison infractions arising out of a conflict with correctional officials. 288 He appeared before a prison adjustment committee, which refused his request to present witnesses at the hearing. 289
Based on the available testimony, the committee concluded that Conner was guilty of the misconduct charged and sentenced him to thirty
days disciplinary segregation for the more serious charge. 290 Conner
subsequently sued the prison officials in federal court, asserting that
the truncated hearing deprived him of due process. 291 The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the prison officials, but
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed. 292 The circuit
court held that Hawaii's regulations created a liberty interest in allowing Conner to remain in the general prison population absent mis279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
See supra notes 117-29 and accompanying text.
See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 478.
Id. (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974)).
Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983).
Id. at 250.
See id. at 251.
See id. at 250-51.
515 U.S. 472 (1995).
See id. at 475.
See id.
See id. at 475-76.
See id. at 476.
See id.
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conduct.2 93 The mandatory language, in other words, created a liberty
interest. Because Conner had not been afforded an adequate hearing
to determine whether he in fact was culpable of the misconduct, the
2 94
court remanded the case back to the district court.
The Supreme Court in turn reversed, concluding that-despite
the mandatory language in the regulatory scheme-Hawaii had not
created an entitlement protected under the Due Process Clause. 295 In
so holding, the Court acknowledged that it was departing from prior
precedents. 296 Plaintiffs could not demonstrate a liberty interest
merely by pointing to mandatory language in a regulatory scheme.2 97
Rather, plaintiffs additionally must persuade the court that the interests protected by the regulatory scheme were of "real substance. ' 298
The Court explained that its new approach was necessary to
avoid the mischief arising from its prior practice of relying on
mandatory language in regulations to determine whether a liberty interest existed.2 99 The Court wrote, "First, [the entitlement approach]
creates disincentives for States to codify prison management procedures in the interest of uniform treatment. '300 Prison rules "are not
set forth solely to benefit the prisoner. They also aspire to instruct
subordinate employees how to exercise discretion ...

and to confine

the authority of prison personnel in order to avoid widely different
treatment of similar incidents. '301 Second, the entitlement approach
enmeshed the "federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons," blunting the flexibility needed by prison administrators in their
jobs.

30 2

The Court concluded, therefore, that liberty interests are "generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life."'30 3 The Court will not intervene if prison authorities in
many contexts depart from preexisting guidelines. 30 4 The lower courts
293. See id.
294. See id. at 477, 505.
295. See id. at 487.
296. See id. at 482-84.
297. See id. at 481-82.
298. Id. at 478.
299. See id. at 481.
300. Id. at 482.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 484.
304. Courts presumably will apply the Sandin reasoning outside of the prison context. For
instance, a school limiting its teachers' discretion to issue after-school detentions would not necessarily create a liberty interest.
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have responded to Sandin by rejecting numerous liberty interest

305
claims that previously would have been cognizable.
The Sandin approach might be extended to other contexts in
which private parties seek to force agencies to comply with previously
formulated rules. 30 6 For instance, courts could determine whether
other agency regulations conferred rights of real substance in the property context. The Sindermann framework 30 7 could be amended such

that only regulations protecting interests of sufficient weight would be
protected. Individuals relying upon civil service tenure, for instance,
might be protected, but perhaps not individuals seeking a hearing
prior to their landlord's effort to raise rent. 30 8 Social security disability beneficiaries may justifiably rely on regulatory promises, 30 9 but not

necessarily regulations permitting their physicians to participate in
Medicare. 310 Indeed, the same policy concerns underlying Sandin ap-

ply just as forcefully in many property contexts. Some employment
rules are created to limit the discretion of supervisors as well as to

protect employees. And, the entitlement approach in the property
context unquestionably has enmeshed "the federal courts in the dayto-day management" of schools 311 and other institutions.
Moreover, in the FTCA context, courts could similarly determine
whether the prior rule violated by the agency was of real substance.
The court in Faber,for instance, could have assessed the importance
of the study of natural risks posed by park users. The court in Irving
could have gauged the significance of the OSHA practice-in contrast
305. See, e.g., Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that alleged
violation of a regulation requiring an inmate to be separated from gang members who had sworn
to kill him was not of real substance); Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding
that alleged violation of a regulation leading to the loss of opportunity to earn good time credits
was not of real substance), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1690 (1996); Kraushaar v. Flanigan, 45 F.3d
1040, 1045 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that an allegation that a strip search violated regulatory
protections was not cognizable).
306. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolutionof the 1990s?, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 1973, 1988-89 (1996) (arguing that Sandin signals the Court's willingness to retreat from
the due process jurisprudence of the 1970s and 1980s).
307. See supra notes 117-29 and accompanying text.
308. Cf. Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1249 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding that tenants in a
government-subsidized housing development do not have a right to be heard on their landlord's
request to the Federal Housing Authority for approval of rent increase).
309. Cf Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (addressing the hearing required following
the termination of Social Security disability benefits).
310. Cf. O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980) (holding there is no
constitutional right to participate in a hearing when one's nursing home is decertified from
Medicare).
311. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (requiring that some process be afforded to protect students from excessive corporal punishment if only through "common-law
constraints and remedies"); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (mandating hearing prior to
suspension).
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to that adopted by the FAA and scrutinized in Varig-of requiring
inspectors to inspect each machine. Similarly, in the APA context, the
Diebold court could have inquired as to the OMB Circular's import in
specifying the steps that agencies should follow prior to reaching the
contracting-out determination. In both contexts, the court could alternatively have considered whether the individual interests at stake
were so vital as to warrant review.
The normative approach, however, is quite troubling. The judiciary-as opposed to agencies-would be the institution determining
the importance of agency benefits and protections. Such normative
assessments are generally made by the legislature, or its delegates in
agencies. Ironically, the normative approach forces the courts to engage in some of the same second-guessing of political priorities that
the Sandin court hoped to avoid.
For instance, courts are currently distinguishing among a wide variety of liberty interests in the prison context to ascertain which regulatory entitlements are important enough to protect under the Due
Process Clause. In Mitchell v. Dupnik,3 12 the Ninth Circuit determined that a pre-trial detainee's interest in the confidentiality of his
legal papers was not of real substance under Sandin.313 The Eighth
Circuit in Callender v. Sioux City Residential Treatment Facility314 determined that state regulations that seemingly provided a right for
participation in a work release program outside prison walls did not
create a liberty interest. 3 15 And, the Seventh Circuit in Babcock v.
White316 held that a Federal Bureau of Prisons directive requiring that
an inmate be housed in a facility separate from members of a gang
that had tried to kill him also did not rise to the level of a liberty
interest. 3 17 On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Carlo v. Chino318 held that California's guarantee of a postbooking telephone call created an interest of real substance protectible under the Due Process Clause. 319 Courts have split as to
whether challenges to protracted periods of time in administrative

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

75 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1996).
See id. at 523.
88 F.3d 666 (8th Cir. 1996).
See id. at 668; accord Dominique v. Weld, 73 F.3d 1156, 1160 (1st Cir. 1996).
102 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 1996).
See id. at 274.
105 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 1997).
See id. at 499-500.
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segregation, in violation of prison regulations, state a claim of real
320
substance.
Aside from the difficulties in reaching a normative judgment, the
Sandin approach is ill-suited to the APA and FTCA contexts. Courts
do not review claims in such contexts because of the importance of the
rule allegedly violated, but because of the consequences of the agency
action challenged. In Faber, for example, the court reviewed the tort
claim due to the need to deter park officials from future negligencethe internal study by itself was not critical. 32 1 In Cardoza, the court
was troubled by the impact of the agency's inaction on the plaintiff,
not by the intrinsic importance of the agency regulations themselves. 322 Thus, in contrast to the due process context, courts generally strain to review cases in the APA and FTCA contexts when the
injury is significant, and the importance of the rule violated is
secondary.
In short, the normative approach suffers from two serious defects.
We do not generally trust courts to distinguish important from more
modest regulatory initiatives. Establishing such priorities is rather
vested in political actors. Moreover, distinguishing among cases because of the importance of the rule violated misses the point of the
APA and FFCA cases, which is to focus on whether the prior rule so
confined the agency's discretion as to permit judicial review of the
substance of the challenged agency decision.
E.

Process Approach

If courts cannot easily second-guess the importance of agency
rules, they nonetheless could oversee agency departure from ruleswhether legislative or less formal-to safeguard the process leading to
the decision to deviate from the prior rule. They could ensure that
agencies depart from rules only when sufficient consideration and deliberation have been afforded. In effect, agencies can change their
minds, but only if in so doing, they create new policy for the future.
The process approach would modify the agency intent to be bound
approach. First, courts would determine through conventional means
320. Compare Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 1995) (remanding to consider
liberty interest), and Lee v. Coughlin, 902 F. Supp. 424, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding liberty
interest), with Wycoff v. Nichols, 94 F.3d 1187, 1189 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding no liberty interest),
and Moorman v. Thalacker, 83 F.3d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 1996) (same).
321. See Faber v. United States, 56 F.3d 1122, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasizing safety).
322. See Cardoza v. CFTC, 768 F.2d 1542, 1544-45 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing impact on
plaintiff rather than reasons for regulations).
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whether the agency intended to bind subordinate officials with the
rule. In the context of legislative rules, that intent to bind is almost
always clear, but the intent becomes murkier with policy statements,
circulars, and the like. Then, before exercising review, courts would
determine whether any departures from binding rules reflected purposeful policy. Although not articulated as such, courts currently follow a process approach in many contexts.
For instance, the Supreme Court has held that agencies should
almost always be entitled to change prior rules as long as they do so
through rulemaking.32 3 The agency may be under a duty to explain
any change, but the agency need not maintain policy in perpetuity.
Moreover, the notice and comment period affords sufficient process to
324
ensure that reliance interests are not arbitrarily violated.
Changing prior rules through adjudication, however, is more
problematic. The Court in Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Railway325 stated that an agency could not repeal a legislative rule in the midst of a subsequent adjudication. 326 The potential
process protections did not suffice because most of those participating
in the prior rulemaking were shut out of the subsequent determination. Only those parties in the adjudication-who might not share the
same interests as those involved in the earlier rulemaking-could
participate.
In contrast, the Court has permitted agencies to change rules developed in adjudication as long as the agencies explain any change in
the second adjudication. In Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB,327
the Board had determined that Shaw's Supermarkets committed an
unfair labor practice in a representation election when, five days
before the election, an official implicitly warned employees they
would receive lower wages and benefits in the case of a pro-union
vote.3 2 8 On review, the court of appeals stated that it would have upheld the agency "[w]ere the Board writing on a blank slate. ' 329 However, because the agency had previously held that such warnings by
323. See supra text accompanying notes 191-95.
324. Similarly, courts have held that agencies can change less formal rules through the same
process that preceded the initial rule. In Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1017 (9th Cir.
1987), the court determined that the INS could rescind a general policy statement providing for
deferral of an alien's deportation status as long as it issued another general policy statement
reflecting the change.
325. 284 U.S. 370 (1932).
326. See id. at 389.
327. 884 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1989).
328. See id. at 34-35.
329. Id. at 36.
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themselves did not constitute unfair labor practices, the court set aside
the agency's conclusion. 330 It stated that "the Board remains free to
modify or change its rule ...as long as it focuses upon the issue and
explains why change is reasonable."' 331 An agency's duty to justify any
position extends to the fact that a present-day position conflicts with a
prior one. The court in effect adopted a process approach, forcing the
agency to confront any change consciously and explain its departure
from past policy. Courts will intervene only when agencies have failed
to acknowledge that their current approach is intended to create new
policy.
Similarly, in Faber, assume that the agency, prior to the diving
accident, had commissioned another study and concluded that warnings should be placed only at National Park sites presenting the most
grave risks, and therefore no longer recommended constructing any
warning atop the falls. That change in policy would have shielded the
federal government from liability under the FTCA. As in Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., the agency would be free to change policy as long as
it did so in a purposeful manner. In Berkovitz, had the agency decided in all cases no longer to collect certain data from the manufacturer, then its failure to conform to past policy on that issue would
have been protected under the discretionary function exception, assuming that the agency had the power to change course. 332 In Clifford, if the agency decided to rely on new factors in granting waivers,
then no review under the APA should have occurred, despite the ostensible failure to follow the prior guidelines.
As opposed to what I have termed the normative and agency intent to be bound approaches, scrutinizing the process by which agencies depart from preexisting rules would preserve a more fundamental
policymaking role for the agency. This approach recognizes, as the
Supreme Court has noted on occasion, that Congress has delegated
the power to agencies to change their minds, whether for political or
330. See id. at 39, 41.
331. Id. at 41; see also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S.
800, 808 (1973) (plurality opinion) ("Whatever the ground for the departure from prior norms,
however, it must be clearly set forth so that the reviewing court may understand the basis of the
agency's action and so may judge the consistency of that action with the agency's mandate.");
Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388 (1957) (stating that although an agency need not bind itself,
"having done so [it] could not, so long as the Regulations remained unchanged, proceed without
regard to them"); Davila-Bardales v. INS, 27 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1994) ("If an administrative
agency decides to depart significantly from its own precedent, it must confront the issue squarely
to explain why the departure is reasonable.").
332. Courts may insist that the agency change policy in conformance with appropriate procedures. See infra text accompanying notes 335-37.
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technological reasons. 333 If the change in position itself reflects new
policy, then that policy is worthy of deference.
Moreover, the process approach may not deter the agency as
much from formulating rules in the first instance as might other approaches. Agencies can depart from rules as long as their departure
sets policy for future action. Parole boards or OSHA can set priorities
or new procedures without fear of liability due to the presence of pol334
icy directives issued by their predecessors. The activity-level effect
therefore would not likely be as pronounced. In comparison to the
agency intent to be bound and normative approaches, the message is
different-courts will step in only when agencies have not purposely
(or with the proper process) deviated from prior policy.
At the same time-in contrast to the normative approach-the
process approach does not leave the agency departure from preexisting policy unchecked. Agency policies are generally formulated only
after considerable debate and input from different levels within the
agency itself. Both the requirement of prospectivity and the period of
deliberation help ensure that the change in policy is not arbitrary.
First, the act of making policy to control future behavior constrains agency discretion. Before the agency acts, more contexts are
considered than just the particular dispute before the agency. Different factual scenarios must be addressed, and contingencies contemplated. A requirement of setting policy for the future safeguards
against ad hoc decisionmaking or decisions based upon impermissible
factors because of the wider and more uncertain application. Second,
and related, the presence of prior deliberation minimizes the risk of
bias or arbitrary governance. The precedential effect of policy suggests that a significant number of people will be interested in the outcome of the policy formulated by agency officials. That level of
interest in turn provides added incentive for care, 335 as long as those

with reliance interests are represented in the political process. 336 The
333. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983);
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
334. See supra notes 156-89 and accompanying text.
335. Cf Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV.
469, 489-90 (1996) (arguing that deference should be afforded to government interpretations of
federal criminal law adopted as official government policy after deliberation).
336. For instance, in the Motor Vehicle case, automobile manufacturers and consumer representatives all participated in the rulemaking leading to the agency's change in policy. 463 U.S. at
34-38. The policy change was checked to the same extent as formulation of any new policy.
Moreover, even in Diebold, the agency may well have consulted with the federal employee union
prior to changing its contracting-out policy-it would have been politically infeasible (and impossible for long) to keep union representatives in the dark. As long as agency departures stem
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process approach relies upon political checks to make the trade-offs
among contemporary political needs, reliance interests, and rule of
law concerns.
In some contexts, the second factor of deliberation may not be
present. Officials may formulate policy without great discussion. But
only the relatively few agency officials with policymaking authority
can create policy for the future. 33 7 Even if there is no prior deliberation within the agency, the fact that an official vested with policymaking authority changes policy at least makes that official more
accountable for the switch, and the switch is likely more visible if
made by a senior agency official with policymaking authority. Policy
creation therefore is likely to be less arbitrary than case-by-case or ad
hoc determinations.
Unlike the normative and reliance models discussed earlier, the
process approach would allow courts to exercise review when lower
level officials ignore binding rules for no apparent reason. In other
words, even if private parties cannot justifiably rely on the rule, courts
arguably should encourage fidelity to binding policy unless there are
good reasons not to. If the OSHA inspectors in Irving did not inspect
the die-out machine because of inadvertence, there is no reason to
protect the agency. If they missed the machine due to a prior decision
to inspect only one out of two similar machines, however, courts
should decline review. And, if an official without policymaking authority made that decision, courts should still review the action.
Hard cases undoubtedly exist. It may be difficult at times to determine which agency officials have policymaking authority and
whether the current policy pursued was intended to change prior policy or resulted rather from disagreement over what the prior policy in
fact was. Accordingly, there is a risk of judicial assumption of agency
policymaking. But that risk must be balanced against the harm that
may stem from failing to monitor lower level officials who depart from
previously set rules. The process approach, therefore, plausibly accommodates the agency's interest in policymaking with the need to
ensure consistent and deliberative agency practice.
Despite its potential attributes, the process approach does not directly respond to the reliance argument. Reliance interests can be
from considered change in policy, therefore, some political checks outside of judicial review
circumscribe the agency's discretion, and there is less need to permit judicial review merely because of the allegation of inconsistency with a prior rule or regulation.
337. If the officials lack policymaking authority, their decision to depart from the prior policy
cannot then shield the agency from suit.
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sundered, as long as the agency decides to override the reliance interest in a deliberative manner. That objection, however, should not
prove dispositive.
In the F-ICA and APA contexts, reliance interests are not critical.
As discussed previously, individuals rarely learn of, let alone rely on,
the internal policy allegedly violated by the agency. And, even some
legislative rules like the forfeiture statute in James Daniel Real Property may not justifiably induce reliance.
In the FTCA context, therefore, the discretionary function exception would shield the government from suit in tort despite the allegation of noncompliance with prior policy if that policy were not
binding, as likely was the case in Faber. Even when the policy is binding, the government could still claim the exception if it could demonstrate that the deviation stemmed from purposeful policy, formulated
by officials with policymaking authority. Moreover, when the discretionary function exception does not apply, a failure to comply with
prior rules should not necessarily be tantamount to a finding of negligence. The departure from prior rules might evince more care than
338
the policy itself.
In the APA context, courts should first scrutinize the rule allegedly violated to determine if it is binding. The courts in Cardoza and
Clifford should never have proceeded to ascertain whether the agency
complied with the regulations because the regulations evidently were
not intended to be binding. The courts should next assess whether the
rule itself sufficiently constrains agency action, as in the MadisonHughes case. 339 Even if the rule does provide constraint, courts
should still permit agencies to make a showing that the failure to comply stemmed from purposeful policy formulated by officials with policymaking authority, and thus that the agency action should remain
exempt from review.
But, even when reliance is fundamental as in the entitlements
context, the process approach should play a critical role. Agencies
must honor the entitlements they create until they decide to change
the entitlement through the appropriate process. Currently, individuals seeking entitlements are entitled to some kind of hearing to assess
whether they are eligible for the job, welfare, or license. For instance,
once one is granted an expectation of continued employment absent
misconduct, then the agency must afford notice and an opportunity to
338. See also supra text accompanying note 114.
339. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
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respond before determining that one has engaged in misconduct. In
part, the hearing ensures that low-level agency officials have not denied one the benefit of the entitlement for impermissible reasons or
simply because of carelessness. The reliance interest demands at least
a hearing before the deprivation becomes permanent.
But suppose, instead, that the agency decides to alter the entitlement for everyone, in other words, to change the tenure provisions of
the job so that no one has any expectation of continued employment.
Conducting a hearing would be beside the point, given that there
would no longer be any function for the hearing.
Judges have not, however, always recognized that across-theboard rules can limit or remove entitlements without triggering procedural due process guarantees. For instance, in Mahlers v. Halford340
the Iowa Department of Corrections instituted a new policy deducting
twenty percent of all funds received by an inmate-including from
outside sources-to fulfill any restitution obligations. 341 Iowa requires inmates to pay restitution to the state to cover court costs and
to compensate victims for injuries received. 342 Inmates challenged the
new policy on due process grounds, principally arguing that notice and
an opportunity to be heard were required prior to the sequestration of
343

funds.
All three judges on the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
analyzed the case on procedural due process grounds. 344 The judges
balanced the individual interest against the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures used and the governmental interest at
stake. 3 45 Indeed, the district court judge and a dissenting court of appeals judge would have required the state to afford inmates additional
pre-deprivation opportunity to contest the twenty percent deduction.346 As a substantive matter, the automatic deduction rule may be

arbitrary, but there appears no reason to afford individualized opportunity to contest what is avowedly an across-the-board provision. The

340. 76 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 696 (1997).
341.

See id. at 952.

342. See id.

343.
for the
344.
345.

See id. Iowa has since revised the policy to provide additional procedural protections
inmates. See id. at 953 (discussing IowA CODE ANN. § 904.702 (West 1997)).
See id. at 954, 956 (majority and Heaney, J., dissenting).
Id. at 955-57 (majority and Heaney, J., dissenting).

346. Id. at 957 (Heaney, J., dissenting). The hearing would have focused on the source of the
outside funds and on the importance of the inmate's intended use of such funds. See id. at 954.
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new rule may have violated the Takings Clause, 347 but no hearing to
348
contest applicability of the rule constitutionally should be due.
The process approach in the entitlements context recognizes that
political checks safeguard against arbitrary agency action. Agencies
can respond to contemporary realities and alter entitlements as long
as they do so overtly. Judicial review should not lock agencies into
policy ill-suited for the present. The process approach therefore suggests that-barring some other constitutional right such as that
grounded in the Takings or Ex Post Facto Clause-agencies can
change entitlements if they reach the new policy in a purposeful
manner.
Similarly, in the liberty interest context, consider that an agency
might desire to revamp parole or work release policies in light of new
perspectives on rehabilitation. Must the agency apply the old policies
to those prisoners already in the system? Although the Ex Post Facto
Clause might bar retroactive changes in parole policies, 349 the Due
Process Clause would not compel a hearing in light of the fact that the
agency has reached its new policy in a deliberative fashion.
Courts have at times ignored the possibility, however, that application of changed policy affecting liberty interests does not itself violate the Due Process Clause. For instance, the Third Circuit in Winsett
v. McGinnes350 decided that, while Delaware could add new conditions for eligibility for a work release program in the future, it could
not retroactively impose new substantive predicates without violating
procedural due process. 35 1 From a process perspective, however, ab347. The Supreme Court in Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 129 (1985) (quoting Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971)) reiterated that "[tihe procedural component of the Due Process
Clause does not 'impose a constitutional limitation on the power of Congress to make substantive changes in the law of entitlement to public benefits."' The legislative process, in essence,
provides all the process that is due. See also Washington Teachers' Union Local #6 v. Board of
Educ., 109 F.3d 774, 779-80 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (questioning whether procedural due process issues
arise when Reduction-in-Force seemingly abrogates state created property interest).
348. If an agency had fashioned the new policy, however, state courts nonetheless should
review the new rule to ensure that it was reached in an appropriate manner. For instance, a
warden, by decree, may not be able to limit an entitlement created by the state prison administration, and the state prison administration may only be able to change a prior policy through
appropriate state procedures under the state administrative procedure act. However, on review
the hands of federal courts might be tied given that only state procedural law might be violated.
See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 124-35 (1984) (holding that
federal courts may not enjoin state institutions or officials on the basis of state law).
349. See Lynce v. Mathis, 117 S. Ct. 891 (1997).
350. 617 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc).
351. See id. at 1007-08. After Sandin, a state's work release framework would likely not be
considered an interest of "real substance" entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause.
See supra text accompanying note 298; see also Shields v. Purkett, 878 S.W.2d 42, 47-48 (Mo.
1994) (holding that due process prevents state from applying new parole policies instead of poli-
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sent ex post facto strictures, agencies can apply new policies if they
follow the proper procedures in reaching that determination, just as
agencies do in changing eligibility criteria for welfare.
In sum, the process approach restructures doctrine in an effort
both to preserve agency policymaking and yet ensure that ad hoc departures from prior agency policy are prevented. Compliance with
prior policy is not an end in itself; rather, review for compliance
should only be the means to ensure greater deliberation before the
agency changes course.
CONCLUSION

Requiring agencies to follow prior policy is beguiling. Courts reason that they will not intrude into agency policymaking if the agency
has no discretion but to follow the preexisting rule. Courts can assess
the agency action against the benchmarks provided by the prior rules
and regulations.
Yet, despite the rule of law concerns, courts often cannot ascertain an agency's compliance with preexisting rules and regulations
without intruding into the agency's policymaking domain. First, the
prospect of more extensive judicial review is itself significant. Agencies will react to the threat of judicial review by promulgating fewer or
at least vaguer rules. The magnitude of the activity-level effect may
be uncertain, but not its existence. Second, if forced to comply with
preexisting rules, agencies, as a theoretical matter, may be unable to
apply new policies to current disputes. Agencies may lose the flexibility to change policy when contemporary technological or financial realities so dictate. Third, courts may and have disagreed with agencies
as to whether their prior policies were binding or what the policies in
fact required. The consequences of reviewing otherwise unreviewable
agency action thus can be quite striking: courts instead of agencies
determine both the ambit of internal management directives and the
sanction to be accorded for failure to comply with preexisting rules
and regulations.
Courts should therefore modify their approach in the three contexts canvassed to preserve agency discretion without sacrificing the
benefits that unquestionably can flow from judicial review. Courts
cies applicable when inmate committed his offense). But cf. Tracy v. Salamack, 572 F.2d 393, 396
(2d Cir. 1978) (agreeing that states can alter entitlements as long as they do not do so in an
arbitrary way-an entitlement "does not have the substantive effect of prohibiting alteration of
the underlying law which creates the entitlement").
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should review otherwise unreviewable agency action only to determine whether the agency failed to comply with binding rules upon
which third parties can justifiably rely, or to ensure that the agency
purposefully departed from the prior policy. Political checks in both
contexts safeguard to some extent against arbitrary departures from
previously formulated policy, while nonetheless preserving the
agency's ability to direct lower level officials to change policy when
contemporary needs dictate.

